Typical delay determines waiting time on periodic-food schedules: Static and dynamic tests.

Pigeons and other animals soon learn to wait (pause) after food delivery on periodic-food schedules before resuming the food-rewarded response. Under most conditions the steady-state duration of the average waiting time, t, is a linear function of the typical interfood interval. We describe three experiments designed to explore the limits of this process. In all experiments, t was associated with one key color and the subsequent food delay, T, with another. In the first experiment, we compared the relation between t (waiting time) and T (food delay) under two conditions: when T was held constant, and when T was an inverse function of t. The pigeons could maximize the rate of food delivery under the first condition by setting t to a consistently short value; optimal behavior under the second condition required a linear relation with unit slope between t and T. Despite this difference in optimal policy, the pigeons in both cases showed the same linear relation, with slope less than one, between t and T. This result was confirmed in a second parametric experiment that added a third condition, in which T + t was held constant. Linear waiting appears to be an obligatory rule for pigeons. In a third experiment we arranged for a multiplicative relation between t and T (positive feedback), and produced either very short or very long waiting times as predicted by a quasi-dynamic model in which waiting time is strongly determined by the just-preceding food delay.

Finite size effects in the presence of a chemical potential: A study in the classical nonlinear O(2) sigma model

In the presence of a chemical potential, the physics of level crossings leads to singularities at zero temperature, even when the spatial volume is finite. These singularities are smoothed out at a finite temperature but leave behind nontrivial finite size effects which must be understood in order to extract thermodynamic quantities using Monte Carlo methods, particularly close to critical points. We illustrate some of these issues using the classical nonlinear O(2) sigma model with a coupling β and chemical potential μ on a 2+1-dimensional Euclidean lattice. In the conventional formulation this model suffers from a sign problem at nonzero chemical potential and hence cannot be studied with the Wolff cluster algorithm. However, when formulated in terms of the worldline of particles, the sign problem is absent, and the model can be studied efficiently with the "worm algorithm." Using this method we study the finite size effects that arise due to the chemical potential and develop an effective quantum mechanical approach to capture the effects. As a side result we obtain energy levels of up to four particles as a function of the box size and uncover a part of the phase diagram in the (β,μ) plane. © 2010 The American Physical Society.

Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Who tests, who doesn't, and why? Uptake of mobile HIV counseling and testing in the Kilimanjaro Region of Tanzania.

BACKGROUND: Optimally, expanded HIV testing programs should reduce barriers to testing while attracting new and high-risk testers. We assessed barriers to testing and HIV risk among clients participating in mobile voluntary counseling and testing (MVCT) campaigns in four rural villages in the Kilimanjaro Region of Tanzania. METHODS: Between December 2007 and April 2008, 878 MVCT participants and 506 randomly selected community residents who did not access MVCT were surveyed. Gender-specific logistic regression models were used to describe differences in socioeconomic characteristics, HIV exposure risk, testing histories, HIV related stigma, and attitudes toward testing between MVCT participants and community residents who did not access MVCT. Gender-specific logistic regression models were used to describe differences in socioeconomic characteristics, HIV exposure risk, testing histories, HIV related stigma, and attitudes toward testing, between the two groups. RESULTS: MVCT clients reported greater HIV exposure risk (OR 1.20 [1.04 to 1.38] for males; OR 1.11 [1.03 to 1.19] for females). Female MVCT clients were more likely to report low household expenditures (OR 1.47 [1.04 to 2.05]), male clients reported higher rates of unstable income sources (OR 1.99 [1.22 to 3.24]). First-time testers were more likely than non-testers to cite distance to testing sites as a reason for not having previously tested (OR 2.17 [1.05 to 4.48] for males; OR 5.95 [2.85 to 12.45] for females). HIV-related stigma, fears of testing or test disclosure, and not being able to leave work were strongly associated with non-participation in MVCT (ORs from 0.11 to 0.84). CONCLUSIONS: MVCT attracted clients with increased exposure risk and fewer economic resources; HIV related stigma and testing-related fears remained barriers to testing. MVCT did not disproportionately attract either first-time or frequent repeat testers. Educational campaigns to reduce stigma and fears of testing could improve the effectiveness of MVCT in attracting new and high-risk populations.

Dispersal patterns in Costa Rican mantled howling monkeys

Both male and female juveniles disperse in Costa Rican mantled howling monkeys (Alouatta palliata). 79% of the males and 96% of the females leave their natal groups. Males may spend up to 4 years and females up to 1 year as solitaries. Extra-group individuals are faced with only three possibilities, i.e., form a new group by joining another extra-group individual, join an established social group, or remain solitary. Most surviving extra-group individuals join an established social group which contains no kin. Females join with the help of a resident male and once in a group proceed to rise to the alpha position through dyadic interactions. The immigrant female either becomes the alpha female or leaves and tries again in another group. Males challenge the alpha male and either defeat him or remain solitary. Competition with relatives for limited high quality food may be the reason for both sexes leaving their natal groups in howlers. By leaving, the successful immigrants increase their mothers inclusive fitness while suppressing the fitness of nonrelatives instead of remaining natal and competing with relatives for limited food. © 1992 Plenum Publishing Corporation.