4 resultados para fishing management fee
em Duke University
Resumo:
The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin’s model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their fishing grounds. Using insights from common- pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls.
Resumo:
Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The "tragedy of the commons" model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997-2001), during (2002) and after (2003-2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Several trials have demonstrated the efficacy of nurse telephone case management for diabetes (DM) and hypertension (HTN) in academic or vertically integrated systems. Little is known about the real-world potency of these interventions. OBJECTIVE: To assess the effectiveness of nurse behavioral management of DM and HTN in community practices among patients with both diseases. DESIGN: The study was designed as a patient-level randomized controlled trial. PARTICIPANTS: Participants included adult patients with both type 2 DM and HTN who were receiving care at one of nine community fee-for-service practices. Subjects were required to have inadequately controlled DM (hemoglobin A1c [A1c] ≥ 7.5%) but could have well-controlled HTN. INTERVENTIONS: All patients received a call from a nurse experienced in DM and HTN management once every two months over a period of two years, for a total of 12 calls. Intervention patients received tailored DM- and HTN- focused behavioral content; control patients received non-tailored, non-interactive information regarding health issues unrelated to DM and HTN (e.g., skin cancer prevention). MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Systolic blood pressure (SBP) and A1c were co-primary outcomes, measured at 6, 12, and 24 months; 24 months was the primary time point. RESULTS: Three hundred seventy-seven subjects were enrolled; 193 were randomized to intervention, 184 to control. Subjects were 55% female and 50% white; the mean baseline A1c was 9.1% (SD = 1%) and mean SBP was 142 mmHg (SD = 20). Eighty-two percent of scheduled interviews were conducted; 69% of intervention patients and 70% of control patients reached the 24-month time point. Expressing model estimated differences as (intervention--control), at 24 months, intervention patients had similar A1c [diff = 0.1 %, 95 % CI (-0.3, 0.5), p = 0.51] and SBP [diff = -0.9 mmHg, 95% CI (-5.4, 3.5), p = 0.68] values compared to control patients. Likewise, DBP (diff = 0.4 mmHg, p = 0.76), weight (diff = 0.3 kg, p = 0.80), and physical activity levels (diff = 153 MET-min/week, p = 0.41) were similar between control and intervention patients. Results were also similar at the 6- and 12-month time points. CONCLUSIONS: In nine community fee-for-service practices, telephonic nurse case management did not lead to improvement in A1c or SBP. Gains seen in telephonic behavioral self-management interventions in optimal settings may not translate to the wider range of primary care settings.
Resumo:
In 1986, New Zealand responded to the open-access problem by establishing the world's largest individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Using a 15-year panel dataset from New Zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas, we assess trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions, consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization. Overall, this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.