How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican Small-Scale Fishing Community

The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin’s model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their fishing grounds. Using insights from common- pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls.

Migration and fishing in Indonesian coastal villages.

The coastal ecosystems in Southeast Asia are under increased pressure from local and global change. This paper examines human migration and the use of marine resources in coastal villages in the Minahasa district of North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Primary data were collected through interviews with village leaders, focus groups, and a sample survey of 600 fishing households. Migration is responsible for at least one quarter of the total growth during the past decade. All groups of fishermen report falling productivity of the nearshore fisheries. Econometric analysis is used to examine the weekly fish catch of the artisanal fishing sector. Migration status and socioeconomic variables seem to have no systematic effect, while fishing effort (labor, boat, and gear), the degree of specialization, and the remoteness of villages are found to be positively related to weekly fish catches.

The Emergence of Access Controls in Small-Scale Fishing Commons: A Comparative Analysis of Individual Licenses and Common Property-Rights in Two Mexican Communities

Addressing global fisheries overexploitation requires better understanding of how small-scale fishing communities in developing countries limit access to fishing grounds. We analyze the performance of a system based on individual licenses and a common property-rights regime in their ability to generate incentives for self-governance and conservation of fishery resources. Using a qualitative before-after-control-impact approach, we compare two neighbouring fishing communities in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Both were initially governed by the same permit system, are situated in the same ecosystem, use similar harvesting technology, and have overharvested similar species. One community changed to a common property-right regime, enabling the emergence of access controls and avoiding overexploitation of benthic resources, while the other community, still relies on the permit system. We discuss the roles played by power, institutions, socio-historic, and biophysical factors to develop access controls. © 2012 The Author(s).

Fishing quota markets

In 1986, New Zealand responded to the open-access problem by establishing the world's largest individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Using a 15-year panel dataset from New Zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas, we assess trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions, consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization. Overall, this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.