6 resultados para existential phenomenology
em Duke University
Resumo:
We investigated the effects of visual input at encoding and retrieval on the phenomenology of memory. In Experiment 1, participants took part in events with and without wearing blindfolds, and later were shown a video of the events. Blindfolding, as well as later viewing of the video, both tended to decrease recollection. In Experiment 2, participants were played videos, with and without the visual component, of events involving other people. Events listened to without visual input were recalled with less recollection; later adding of the visual component increased recollection. In Experiment 3, participants were provided with progressively more information about events that they had experienced, either in the form of photographs that they had taken of the events or narrative descriptions of those photographs. In comparison with manipulations at encoding, the addition of more visual or narrative cues at recall had similar but smaller effects on recollection.
Resumo:
An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.
Resumo:
Memory for complex everyday events involving vision, hearing, smell, emotion, narrative, and language cannot be understood without considering the properties of the separate systems that process and store each of these forms of information. Using this premise as a starting point, my colleagues and I found that visual memory plays a central role in autobiographical memory: The strength of recollection of an event is predicted best by the vividness of its visual imagery, and a loss of visual memory causes a general amnesia. Examination of autobiographical memories in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suggests that the lack of coherence often noted in memories of traumatic events is not due to a lack of coherence either of the memory itself or of the narrative that integrates the memory into the life story. Rather, making the traumatic memory central to the life story correlates positively with increased PTSD symptoms. The basic-systems approach has yielded insights into autobiographical memory's phenomenology, neuropsychology, clinical disorders, and neural basis. Copyright © 2005 American Psychological Society.
Resumo:
It is widely appreciated that larvae of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans arrest development by forming dauer larvae in response to multiple unfavorable environmental conditions. C. elegans larvae can also reversibly arrest development earlier, during the first larval stage (L1), in response to starvation. "L1 arrest" (also known as "L1 diapause") occurs without morphological modification but is accompanied by increased stress resistance. Caloric restriction and periodic fasting can extend adult lifespan, and developmental models are critical to understanding how the animal is buffered from fluctuations in nutrient availability, impacting lifespan. L1 arrest provides an opportunity to study nutritional control of development. Given its relevance to aging, diabetes, obesity and cancer, interest in L1 arrest is increasing, and signaling pathways and gene regulatory mechanisms controlling arrest and recovery have been characterized. Insulin-like signaling is a critical regulator, and it is modified by and acts through microRNAs. DAF-18/PTEN, AMP-activated kinase and fatty acid biosynthesis are also involved. The nervous system, epidermis, and intestine contribute systemically to regulation of arrest, but cell-autonomous signaling likely contributes to regulation in the germline. A relatively small number of genes affecting starvation survival during L1 arrest are known, and many of them also affect adult lifespan, reflecting a common genetic basis ripe for exploration. mRNA expression is well characterized during arrest, recovery, and normal L1 development, providing a metazoan model for nutritional control of gene expression. In particular, post-recruitment regulation of RNA polymerase II is under nutritional control, potentially contributing to a rapid and coordinated response to feeding. The phenomenology of L1 arrest will be reviewed, as well as regulation of developmental arrest and starvation survival by various signaling pathways and gene regulatory mechanisms.
Resumo:
Idioms of distress communicate suffering via reference to shared ethnopsychologies, and better understanding of idioms of distress can contribute to effective clinical and public health communication. This systematic review is a qualitative synthesis of "thinking too much" idioms globally, to determine their applicability and variability across cultures. We searched eight databases and retained publications if they included empirical quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-methods research regarding a "thinking too much" idiom and were in English. In total, 138 publications from 1979 to 2014 met inclusion criteria. We examined the descriptive epidemiology, phenomenology, etiology, and course of "thinking too much" idioms and compared them to psychiatric constructs. "Thinking too much" idioms typically reference ruminative, intrusive, and anxious thoughts and result in a range of perceived complications, physical and mental illnesses, or even death. These idioms appear to have variable overlap with common psychiatric constructs, including depression, anxiety, and PTSD. However, "thinking too much" idioms reflect aspects of experience, distress, and social positioning not captured by psychiatric diagnoses and often show wide within-cultural variation, in addition to between-cultural differences. Taken together, these findings suggest that "thinking too much" should not be interpreted as a gloss for psychiatric disorder nor assumed to be a unitary symptom or syndrome within a culture. We suggest five key ways in which engagement with "thinking too much" idioms can improve global mental health research and interventions: it (1) incorporates a key idiom of distress into measurement and screening to improve validity of efforts at identifying those in need of services and tracking treatment outcomes; (2) facilitates exploration of ethnopsychology in order to bolster cultural appropriateness of interventions; (3) strengthens public health communication to encourage engagement in treatment; (4) reduces stigma by enhancing understanding, promoting treatment-seeking, and avoiding unintentionally contributing to stigmatization; and (5) identifies a key locally salient treatment target.
Resumo:
Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.