The Roles of Phenotypic Plasticity and Plant-Microbe Interactions in the Evolution of Complex Traits in Boechera stricta

All organisms live in complex habitats that shape the course of their evolution by altering the phenotype expressed by a given genotype (a phenomenon known as phenotypic plasticity) and simultaneously by determining the evolutionary fitness of that phenotype. In some cases, phenotypic evolution may alter the environment experienced by future generations. This dissertation describes how genetic and environmental variation act synergistically to affect the evolution of glucosinolate defensive chemistry and flowering time in Boechera stricta, a wild perennial herb. I focus particularly on plant-associated microbes as a part of the plant’s environment that may alter trait evolution and in turn be affected by the evolution of those traits. In the first chapter I measure glucosinolate production and reproductive fitness of over 1,500 plants grown in common gardens in four diverse natural habitats, to describe how patterns of plasticity and natural selection intersect and may influence glucosinolate evolution. I detected extensive genetic variation for glucosinolate plasticity and determined that plasticity may aid colonization of new habitats by moving phenotypes in the same direction as natural selection. In the second chapter I conduct a greenhouse experiment to test whether naturally-occurring soil microbial communities contributed to the differences in phenotype and selection that I observed in the field experiment. I found that soil microbes cause plasticity of flowering time but not glucosinolate production, and that they may contribute to natural selection on both traits; thus, non-pathogenic plant-associated microbes are an environmental feature that could shape plant evolution. In the third chapter, I combine a multi-year, multi-habitat field experiment with high-throughput amplicon sequencing to determine whether B. stricta-associated microbial communities are shaped by plant genetic variation. I found that plant genotype predicts the diversity and composition of leaf-dwelling bacterial communities, but not root-associated bacterial communities. Furthermore, patterns of host genetic control over associated bacteria were largely site-dependent, indicating an important role for genotype-by-environment interactions in microbiome assembly. Together, my results suggest that soil microbes influence the evolution of plant functional traits and, because they are sensitive to plant genetic variation, this trait evolution may alter the microbial neighborhood of future B. stricta generations. Complex patterns of plasticity, selection, and symbiosis in natural habitats may impact the evolution of glucosinolate profiles in Boechera stricta.

The Evolution of Chimpanzee Sanctuaries in the United States

Chimpanzees are native only to the jungles of equatorial Africa, but for the last hundred years, they have also lived in captivity in the United States, most commonly in biomedical research laboratories, but also at Air Force bases for experiments for the space program, at accredited and unaccredited zoos, at circuses, as performers in Hollywood and even in private homes and backyards as pets. But that has been gradually evolving over the last few decades, as more and more chimpanzees move to newly-established chimpanzee sanctuaries. That transition was already underway even before the announcement by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) last year that it will retire all of its remaining chimpanzees from labs to sanctuaries. By thoroughly examining the evolution of these sanctuaries leading up to that seminal decision, along with the many challenges they face, including money, medical care, conflicting philosophies on the treatment of animals and the pitfalls that have led other sanctuaries to the brink of ruin, we can take away a better understanding of why chimpanzee sanctuaries are needed and why caretakers of other animal species are now looking to the chimpanzee sanctuary movement as a model to show how animals can be cared for in retirement.

A Hard Bargain? A cost-benefit analysis of an improved cookstove program in India

In developing countries, access to modern energy for cooking and heating still remains a challenge to raising households out of poverty. About 2.5 billion people depend on solid fuels such as biomass, wood, charcoal and animal dung. The use of solid fuels has negative outcomes for health, the environment and economic development (Universal Energy Access, UNDP). In low income countries, 1.3 million deaths occur due to indoor smoke or air pollution from burning solid fuels in small, confined and unventilated kitchens or homes. In addition, pollutants such as black carbon, methane and ozone, emitted when burning inefficient fuels, are responsible for a fraction of the climate change and air pollution. There are international efforts to promote the use of clean cookstoves in developing countries but limited evidence on the economic benefits of such distribution programs. This study undertook a systematic economic evaluation of a program that distributed subsidized improved cookstoves to rural households in India. The evaluation examined the effect of different levels of subsidies on the net benefits to the household and to society. This paper answers the question, “Ex post, what are the economic benefits to various stakeholders of a program that distributed subsidized improved cookstoves?” In addressing this question, the evaluation used empirical data from India applied to a cost-benefit model to examine how subsidies affect the costs and the benefits of the biomass improved cookstove and the electric improved cookstove to different stakeholders.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.