Game-Theoretically Allocating Resources to Catch Evaders and Payments to Stabilize Teams

Allocating resources optimally is a nontrivial task, especially when multiple

self-interested agents with conflicting goals are involved. This dissertation

uses techniques from game theory to study two classes of such problems:

allocating resources to catch agents that attempt to evade them, and allocating

payments to agents in a team in order to stabilize it. Besides discussing what

allocations are optimal from various game-theoretic perspectives, we also study

how to efficiently compute them, and if no such algorithms are found, what

computational hardness results can be proved.

The first class of problems is inspired by real-world applications such as the

TOEFL iBT test, course final exams, driver's license tests, and airport security

patrols. We call them test games and security games. This dissertation first

studies test games separately, and then proposes a framework of Catcher-Evader

games (CE games) that generalizes both test games and security games. We show

that the optimal test strategy can be efficiently computed for scored test

games, but it is hard to compute for many binary test games. Optimal Stackelberg

strategies are hard to compute for CE games, but we give an empirically

efficient algorithm for computing their Nash equilibria. We also prove that the

Nash equilibria of a CE game are interchangeable.

The second class of problems involves how to split a reward that is collectively

obtained by a team. For example, how should a startup distribute its shares, and

what salary should an enterprise pay to its employees. Several stability-based

solution concepts in cooperative game theory, such as the core, the least core,

and the nucleolus, are well suited to this purpose when the goal is to avoid

coalitions of agents breaking off. We show that some of these solution concepts

can be justified as the most stable payments under noise. Moreover, by adjusting

the noise models (to be arguably more realistic), we obtain new solution

concepts including the partial nucleolus, the multiplicative least core, and the

multiplicative nucleolus. We then study the computational complexity of those

solution concepts under the constraint of superadditivity. Our result is based

on what we call Small-Issues-Large-Team games and it applies to popular

representation schemes such as MC-nets.

An energy-efficient data delivery scheme for delay-sensitive traffic in wireless sensor networks

We propose a novel data-delivery method for delay-sensitive traffic that significantly reduces the energy consumption in wireless sensor networks without reducing the number of packets that meet end-to-end real-time deadlines. The proposed method, referred to as SensiQoS, leverages the spatial and temporal correlation between the data generated by events in a sensor network and realizes energy savings through application-specific in-network aggregation of the data. SensiQoS maximizes energy savings by adaptively waiting for packets from upstream nodes to perform in-network processing without missing the real-time deadline for the data packets. SensiQoS is a distributed packet scheduling scheme, where nodes make localized decisions on when to schedule a packet for transmission to meet its end-to-end real-time deadline and to which neighbor they should forward the packet to save energy. We also present a localized algorithm for nodes to adapt to network traffic to maximize energy savings in the network. Simulation results show that SensiQoS improves the energy savings in sensor networks where events are sensed by multiple nodes, and spatial and/or temporal correlation exists among the data packets. Energy savings due to SensiQoS increase with increase in the density of the sensor nodes and the size of the sensed events. © 2010 Harshavardhan Sabbineni and Krishnendu Chakrabarty.