Essays on Banking Competition

I study local shocks to consumer credit supply arising from the opening

of bank-related retail stores. Bank-related store openings coincide with

sharp increases in credit card placements in the neighborhood of the

store, in the months surrounding the store opening, and with the bank

that owns the store. I exploit this relationship to instrument for new

credit cards at the individual level, and find that obtaining a new

credit card sharply increases total borrowing as well as default risk,

particularly for risky and opaque borrowers. In line with theories of

default externality, I observe that existing lenders react to the

increased consumer borrowing and associated riskiness by contracting

their own supply. In particular, in the year following the issuance of a

new credit card, banks without links to stores reduce credit card limits

by 24-51%, offsetting most of the initial increase in total credit

limits.

The Life Cycle of Corporate Venture Capital

This paper establishes the life-cycle dynamics of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) to explore the information acquisition role of CVC investment in the process of corporate innovation. I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to isolate exogenous shocks to a firm's ability to innovate. Using this strategy, I first find that the CVC life cycle typically begins following a period of deteriorated corporate innovation and increasingly valuable external information, lending support to the hypothesis that firms conduct CVC investment to acquire information and innovation knowledge from startups. Building on this analysis, I show that CVCs acquire information by investing in companies with similar technological focus but have a different knowledge base. Following CVC investment, parent firms internalize the newly acquired knowledge into internal R&D and external acquisition decisions. Human capital renewal, such as hiring inventors who can integrate new innovation knowledge, is integral in this step. The CVC life cycle lasts about four years, terminating as innovation in the parent firm rebounds. These findings shed new light on discussions about firm boundaries, managing innovation, and corporate information choices.

The Effect of Reputation Shocks to Rating Agencies on Corporate Disclosures

This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.