Efficient Prices at Any Cost: Does Algorithmic Trading Deter Information Acquisition?

I demonstrate a powerful tension between acquiring information and incorporating it into asset prices, the two core elements of price discovery. As a salient case, I focus on the transformative rise of algorithmic trading (AT) typically associated with improved price efficiency. Using a measure of the relative information content of prices and a comprehensive panel of 37,325 stock-quarters of SEC market data, I establish instead that algorithmic trading strongly decreases the net amount of information in prices. The increase in price distortions associated with the AT “information gap” is roughly $42.6 billion/year for U.S. common stocks around earnings announcement events alone. Information losses are concentrated among stocks with high shares of algorithmic liquidity takers relative to algorithmic liquidity makers, suggesting that aggressive AT powerfully deters fundamental information acquisition despite its importance for translating available information into prices.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.