Long-term equity anticipation securities and stock market volatility dynamics

Recent empirical findings suggest that the long-run dependence in U.S. stock market volatility is best described by a slowly mean-reverting fractionally integrated process. The present study complements this existing time-series-based evidence by comparing the risk-neutralized option pricing distributions from various ARCH-type formulations. Utilizing a panel data set consisting of newly created exchange traded long-term equity anticipation securities, or leaps, on the Standard and Poor's 500 stock market index with maturity times ranging up to three years, we find that the degree of mean reversion in the volatility process implicit in these prices is best described by a Fractionally Integrated EGARCH (FIEGARCH) model. © 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Brands, Close Relationships, and Consumer Well-Being

Consumers have relationships with other people, and they have relationships with brands similar to the ones they have with other people. Yet, very little is known about how brand and interpersonal relationships relate to one another. Even less is known about how they jointly affect consumer well-being. The goal of this research, therefore, is to examine how brand and interpersonal relationships influence and are influenced by consumer well-being. Essay 1 uses both empirical methods and surveys from individuals and couples to investigate how consumer preferences in romantic couples, namely brand compatibility, influences life satisfaction. Using traditional statistical techniques and multilevel modeling, I find that the effect of brand compatibility, or the extent to which individuals have similar brand preferences, on life satisfaction depends upon power in the relationship. For high power partners, brand compatibility has no effect on life satisfaction. On the other hand, for low power partners, low brand compatibility is associated with decreased life satisfaction. I find that conflict mediates the link between brand compatibility and power on life satisfaction. In Essay 2 I again use empirical methods and surveys to investigate how resources, which can be considered a form of consumer well-being, influence brand and interpersonal relations. Although social connections have long been considered a fundamental human motivation and deemed necessary for well-being (Baumeister and Leary 1995), recent research has demonstrated that having greater resources is associated with weaker social connections. In the current research I posit that individuals with greater resources still have a need to connect and are using other sources for connection, namely brands. Across several studies I test and find support for my theory that resource level shifts the preference of social connection from people to brands. Specifically, I find that individuals with greater resources have stronger brand relationships, as measured by self-brand connection, brand satisfaction, purchase intentions and willingness to pay with both existing brand relationships and with new brands. This suggests that individuals with greater resources place more emphasis on these relationships. Furthermore, I find that resource level influences the stated importance of brand and interpersonal relationships, and that having or perceiving greater resources is associated with an increased preference to engage with brands over people. This research demonstrates that there are times when people prefer and seek out connections with brands over other people, and highlights the ways in which our brand and interpersonal relationships influence one another.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.