Establishing a regional, multisite database for quality improvement and service planning in community-based palliative care and hospice.

BACKGROUND: Outpatient palliative care, an evolving delivery model, seeks to improve continuity of care across settings and to increase access to services in hospice and palliative medicine (HPM). It can provide a critical bridge between inpatient palliative care and hospice, filling the gap in community-based supportive care for patients with advanced life-limiting illness. Low capacities for data collection and quantitative research in HPM have impeded assessment of the impact of outpatient palliative care. APPROACH: In North Carolina, a regional database for community-based palliative care has been created through a unique partnership between a HPM organization and academic medical center. This database flexibly uses information technology to collect patient data, entered at the point of care (e.g., home, inpatient hospice, assisted living facility, nursing home). HPM physicians and nurse practitioners collect data; data are transferred to an academic site that assists with analyses and data management. Reports to community-based sites, based on data they provide, create a better understanding of local care quality. CURRENT STATUS: The data system was developed and implemented over a 2-year period, starting with one community-based HPM site and expanding to four. Data collection methods were collaboratively created and refined. The database continues to grow. Analyses presented herein examine data from one site and encompass 2572 visits from 970 new patients, characterizing the population, symptom profiles, and change in symptoms after intervention. CONCLUSION: A collaborative regional approach to HPM data can support evaluation and improvement of palliative care quality at the local, aggregated, and statewide levels.

Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries management.

Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The "tragedy of the commons" model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997-2001), during (2002) and after (2003-2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives.