Spectral sensitivity, spatial resolution and temporal resolution and their implications for conspecific signalling in cleaner shrimp.

Cleaner shrimp (Decapoda) regularly interact with conspecifics and client reef fish, both of which appear colourful and finely patterned to human observers. However, whether cleaner shrimp can perceive the colour patterns of conspecifics and clients is unknown, because cleaner shrimp visual capabilities are unstudied. We quantified spectral sensitivity and temporal resolution using electroretinography (ERG), and spatial resolution using both morphological (inter-ommatidial angle) and behavioural (optomotor) methods in three cleaner shrimp species: Lysmata amboinensis, Ancylomenes pedersoni and Urocaridella antonbruunii. In all three species, we found strong evidence for only a single spectral sensitivity peak of (mean ± s.e.m.) 518 ± 5, 518 ± 2 and 533 ± 3 nm, respectively. Temporal resolution in dark-adapted eyes was 39 ± 1.3, 36 ± 0.6 and 34 ± 1.3 Hz. Spatial resolution was 9.9 ± 0.3, 8.3 ± 0.1 and 11 ± 0.5 deg, respectively, which is low compared with other compound eyes of similar size. Assuming monochromacy, we present approximations of cleaner shrimp perception of both conspecifics and clients, and show that cleaner shrimp visual capabilities are sufficient to detect the outlines of large stimuli, but not to detect the colour patterns of conspecifics or clients, even over short distances. Thus, conspecific viewers have probably not played a role in the evolution of cleaner shrimp appearance; rather, further studies should investigate whether cleaner shrimp colour patterns have evolved to be viewed by client reef fish, many of which possess tri- and tetra-chromatic colour vision and relatively high spatial acuity.

Clean Cookstoves and Health in Samlout, Cambodia

This paper discusses results from a study of the use of cleaner cooking solutions and general health status of people in rural areas from the Battambang province of Cambodia. Data collection included 372 demographic, health and socio-economic surveys with households living in 6 villages in the Samlout district, general health examinations, and measurements of stove use and household concentrations of PM 2.5. The data reveal that health in this population is a major concern, with a very high prevalence of reported abdominal pain, nausea, chronic cough, chest pains, and fever during examinations.  At the household level, we find that clean stove ownership is significantly correlated with the educational status of household head and socio-economic status of a household. Respondents from households with clean stoves appear less likely (though not statistically significantly so) to report household individuals having health problems such as occasional cough, high blood pressure and tuberculosis. Concentrations of PM2.5 are positively correlated with prevalence of occasional cough, high blood pressure and tuberculosis. Based on these results, we advise field testing and evaluation of targeted health interventions in these villages to address the numerous concerns of the local population, including exploring the potential role of clean stoves.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.