Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.

Are immigrant remittance flows a source of capital for development?

There is a general presumption in the literature and among policymakers that immigrant remittances play the same role in economic development as foreign direct investment and other capital flows, but this is an open question. We develop a model of remittances based on the economics of the family that implies that remittances are not profit-driven, but are compensatory transfers, and should have a negative correlation with GDP growth. This is in contrast to the positive correlation of profit-driven capital flows with GDP growth. We test this implication of our model using a new panel data set on remittances and find a robust negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth. This indicates that remittances may not be intended to serve as a source of capital for economic development. © 2005 International Monetary Fund.

Beyond signaling and human capital: Education and the revelation of ability

We provide evidence that college graduation plays a direct role in revealing ability to the labor market. Using the NLSY79, our results suggest that ability is observed nearly perfectly for college graduates, but is revealed to the labor market more gradually for high school graduates. Consequently, from the beginning of their careers, college graduates are paid in accordance with their own ability, while the wages of high school graduates are initially unrelated to their own ability. This view of ability revelation in the labor market has considerable power in explaining racial differences in wages, education, and returns to ability.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

Credit scores, cardiovascular disease risk, and human capital.

Credit scores are the most widely used instruments to assess whether or not a person is a financial risk. Credit scoring has been so successful that it has expanded beyond lending and into our everyday lives, even to inform how insurers evaluate our health. The pervasive application of credit scoring has outpaced knowledge about why credit scores are such useful indicators of individual behavior. Here we test if the same factors that lead to poor credit scores also lead to poor health. Following the Dunedin (New Zealand) Longitudinal Study cohort of 1,037 study members, we examined the association between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk and the underlying factors that account for this association. We find that credit scores are negatively correlated with cardiovascular disease risk. Variation in household income was not sufficient to account for this association. Rather, individual differences in human capital factors—educational attainment, cognitive ability, and self-control—predicted both credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk and accounted for ∼45% of the correlation between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk. Tracing human capital factors back to their childhood antecedents revealed that the characteristic attitudes, behaviors, and competencies children develop in their first decade of life account for a significant portion (∼22%) of the link between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk at midlife. We discuss the implications of these findings for policy debates about data privacy, financial literacy, and early childhood interventions.

Computational Journalism: from Answering Question to Questioning Answers and Raising Good Questions

Our media is saturated with claims of ``facts'' made from data. Database research has in the past focused on how to answer queries, but has not devoted much attention to discerning more subtle qualities of the resulting claims, e.g., is a claim ``cherry-picking''? This paper proposes a Query Response Surface (QRS) based framework that models claims based on structured data as parameterized queries. A key insight is that we can learn a lot about a claim by perturbing its parameters and seeing how its conclusion changes. This framework lets us formulate and tackle practical fact-checking tasks --- reverse-engineering vague claims, and countering questionable claims --- as computational problems. Within the QRS based framework, we take one step further, and propose a problem along with efficient algorithms for finding high-quality claims of a given form from data, i.e. raising good questions, in the first place. This is achieved to using a limited number of high-valued claims to represent high-valued regions of the QRS. Besides the general purpose high-quality claim finding problem, lead-finding can be tailored towards specific claim quality measures, also defined within the QRS framework. An example of uniqueness-based lead-finding is presented for ``one-of-the-few'' claims, landing in interpretable high-quality claims, and an adjustable mechanism for ranking objects, e.g. NBA players, based on what claims can be made for them. Finally, we study the use of visualization as a powerful way of conveying results of a large number of claims. An efficient two stage sampling algorithm is proposed for generating input of 2d scatter plot with heatmap, evalutaing a limited amount of data, while preserving the two essential visual features, namely outliers and clusters. For all the problems, we present real-world examples and experiments that demonstrate the power of our model, efficiency of our algorithms, and usefulness of their results.