A COMPARISON OF MARKET CLEARING TOOLS IN ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS

To maintain a strict balance between demand and supply in the US power systems, the Independent System Operators (ISOs) schedule power plants and determine electricity prices using a market clearing model. This model determines for each time period and power plant, the times of startup, shutdown, the amount of power production, and the provisioning of spinning and non-spinning power generation reserves, etc. Such a deterministic optimization model takes as input the characteristics of all the generating units such as their power generation installed capacity, ramp rates, minimum up and down time requirements, and marginal costs for production, as well as the forecast of intermittent energy such as wind and solar, along with the minimum reserve requirement of the whole system. This reserve requirement is determined based on the likelihood of outages on the supply side and on the levels of error forecasts in demand and intermittent generation. With increased installed capacity of intermittent renewable energy, determining the appropriate level of reserve requirements has become harder. Stochastic market clearing models have been proposed as an alternative to deterministic market clearing models. Rather than using a fixed reserve targets as an input, stochastic market clearing models take different scenarios of wind power into consideration and determine reserves schedule as output. Using a scaled version of the power generation system of PJM, a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia, and wind scenarios generated from BPA (Bonneville Power Administration) data, this paper explores a comparison of the performance between a stochastic and deterministic model in market clearing. The two models are compared in their ability to contribute to the affordability, reliability and sustainability of the electricity system, measured in terms of total operational costs, load shedding and air emissions. The process of building the models and running for tests indicate that a fair comparison is difficult to obtain due to the multi-dimensional performance metrics considered here, and the difficulty in setting up the parameters of the models in a way that does not advantage or disadvantage one modeling framework. Along these lines, this study explores the effect that model assumptions such as reserve requirements, value of lost load (VOLL) and wind spillage costs have on the comparison of the performance of stochastic vs deterministic market clearing models.

Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation

We assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy. We evaluate the relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions reduction, efficiency, and other outcomes. We also assess how the nature of technological progress through learning and research and development (R&D), and the degree of knowledge spillovers, affects the desirability of different policies. Due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy involves a portfolio of different instruments targeted at emissions, learning, and R&D. Although the relative cost of individual policies in achieving reductions depends on parameter values and the emissions target, in a numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, the ranking is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies achieves emissions reductions at a significantly lower cost than any single policy. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs.

The research and development costs of 68 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is 403 million US dollars (2000 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of 802 million US dollars (2000 dollars). When compared to the results of an earlier study with a similar methodology, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price inflation.

Cost-effectiveness of electricity energy efficiency programs

We analyze the cost-effectiveness of electric utility ratepayer-funded programs to promote demand-side management (DSM) and energy efficiency (EE) investments. We specify a model that relates electricity demand to previous EE DSM spending, energy prices, income, weather, and other demand factors. In contrast to previous studies, we allow EE DSM spending to have a potential longterm demand effect and explicitly address possible endogeneity in spending. We find that current period EE DSM expenditures reduce electricity demand and that this effect persists for a number of years. Our findings suggest that ratepayer funded DSM expenditures between 1992 and 2006 produced a central estimate of 0.9 percent savings in electricity consumption over that time period and a 1.8 percent savings over all years. These energy savings came at an expected average cost to utilities of roughly 5 cents per kWh saved when future savings are discounted at a 5 percent rate. Copyright © 2012 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.