The Haemophilus influenzae HMW1C protein is a glycosyltransferase that transfers hexose residues to asparagine sites in the HMW1 adhesin.

The Haemophilus influenzae HMW1 adhesin is a high-molecular weight protein that is secreted by the bacterial two-partner secretion pathway and mediates adherence to respiratory epithelium, an essential early step in the pathogenesis of H. influenzae disease. In recent work, we discovered that HMW1 is a glycoprotein and undergoes N-linked glycosylation at multiple asparagine residues with simple hexose units rather than N-acetylated hexose units, revealing an unusual N-glycosidic linkage and suggesting a new glycosyltransferase activity. Glycosylation protects HMW1 against premature degradation during the process of secretion and facilitates HMW1 tethering to the bacterial surface, a prerequisite for HMW1-mediated adherence. In the current study, we establish that the enzyme responsible for glycosylation of HMW1 is a protein called HMW1C, which is encoded by the hmw1 gene cluster and shares homology with a group of bacterial proteins that are generally associated with two-partner secretion systems. In addition, we demonstrate that HMW1C is capable of transferring glucose and galactose to HMW1 and is also able to generate hexose-hexose bonds. Our results define a new family of bacterial glycosyltransferases.

Perceived acceptability of home-based couples voluntary HIV counseling and testing in Northern Tanzania.

It is estimated that 5.6% of the Tanzanian population ages 15-49 are infected with HIV, but only 30% of adults have ever had an HIV test. Couples' testing has proven to increase testing coverage and introduce HIV prevention, but barriers include access to testing services and unequal gender dynamics in relationships. Innovative approaches are needed to address barriers to couple's testing and increase uptake of HIV testing. Using qualitative data collection methods, a formative study was conducted to assess the acceptability of a home-based couples counseling and testing (HBCCT) approach. Eligible study participants included married men and women, HIV-infected individuals, health care and home-based care providers, voluntary counseling and testing counselors, and community leaders. A total of 91 individuals participated in focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews conducted between September 2009 and January 2010 in rural settings in Northern Tanzania. An HBCCT intervention appears to be broadly acceptable among participants. Benefits of HBCCT were identified in terms of access, confidentiality, and strengthening the relationship. Fears of negative consequences from knowing one's HIV status, including stigma, blame, physical abuse, or divorce, remain a concern and a potential barrier to the successful provision of the intervention. Lessons for implementation highlighted the importance of appointments for home visits, building relationships of confidence and trust between counselors and clients, and assessing and responding to a couple's readiness to undergo HIV testing. HBCCT should addresses HIV stigma, emphasize confidentiality, and improve communication skills for disclosure and decision-making among couples.

The frequency of voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories across the life span.

In the present study, ratings of the memory of an important event from the previous week on the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval, belief in its accuracy, visual imagery, auditory imagery, setting, emotional intensity, valence, narrative coherence, and centrality to the life story were obtained from 988 adults whose ages ranged from 15 to over 90. Another 992 adults provided the same ratings for a memory from their confirmation day, when they were at about age 14. The frequencies of involuntary and voluntary retrieval were similar. Both frequencies were predicted by emotional intensity and centrality to the life story. The results from the present study-which is the first to measure the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval for the same events-are counter to both cognitive and clinical theories, which consistently claim that involuntary memories are infrequent as compared with voluntary memories. Age and gender differences are noted.

Memory in posttraumatic stress disorder: properties of voluntary and involuntary, traumatic and nontraumatic autobiographical memories in people with and without posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms.

One hundred fifteen undergraduates rated 15 word-cued memories and their 3 most negatively stressful, 3 most positive, and 7 most important events and completed tests of personality and depression. Eighty-nine also recorded involuntary memories online for 1 week. In the first 3-way comparisons needed to test existing theories, comparisons were made of memories of stressful events versus control events and involuntary versus voluntary memories in people high versus low in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity. For all participants, stressful memories had more emotional intensity, more frequent voluntary and involuntary retrieval, but not more fragmentation. For all memories, participants with greater PTSD symptom severity showed the same differences. Involuntary memories had more emotional intensity and less centrality to the life story than voluntary memories. Meeting the diagnostic criteria for traumatic events had no effect, but the emotional responses to events did. In 533 undergraduates, correlations among measures were replicated and the Negative Intensity factor of the Affect Intensity Measure correlated with PTSD symptom severity. No special trauma mechanisms were needed to account for the results, which are summarized by the autobiographical memory theory of PTSD.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.