Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries management.

Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The "tragedy of the commons" model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997-2001), during (2002) and after (2003-2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives.

Integrated vector management for malaria control in Uganda: knowledge, perceptions and policy development.

BACKGROUND: Integrated vector management (IVM) is increasingly being recommended as an option for sustainable malaria control. However, many malaria-endemic countries lack a policy framework to guide and promote the approach. The objective of the study was to assess knowledge and perceptions in relation to current malaria vector control policy and IVM in Uganda, and to make recommendations for consideration during future development of a specific IVM policy. METHODS: The study used a structured questionnaire to interview 34 individuals working at technical or policy-making levels in health, environment, agriculture and fisheries sectors. Specific questions on IVM focused on the following key elements of the approach: integration of chemical and non-chemical interventions of vector control; evidence-based decision making; inter-sectoral collaboration; capacity building; legislation; advocacy and community mobilization. RESULTS: All participants were familiar with the term IVM and knew various conventional malaria vector control (MVC) methods. Only 75% thought that Uganda had a MVC policy. Eighty percent (80%) felt there was inter-sectoral collaboration towards IVM, but that it was poor due to financial constraints, difficulties in involving all possible sectors and political differences. The health, environment and agricultural sectors were cited as key areas requiring cooperation in order for IVM to succeed. Sixty-seven percent (67%) of participants responded that communities were actively being involved in MVC, while 48% felt that the use of research results for evidence-based decision making was inadequate or poor. A majority of the participants felt that malaria research in Uganda was rarely used to facilitate policy changes. Suggestions by participants for formulation of specific and effective IVM policy included: revising the MVC policy and IVM-related policies in other sectors into a single, unified IVM policy and, using legislation to enforce IVM in development projects. CONCLUSION: Integrated management of malaria vectors in Uganda remains an underdeveloped component of malaria control policy. Cooperation between the health and other sectors needs strengthening and funding for MVC increased in order to develop and effectively implement an appropriate IVM policy. Continuous engagement of communities by government as well as monitoring and evaluation of vector control programmes will be crucial for sustaining IVM in the country.