Essays in Macro Finance

I study the link between capital markets and sources of macroeconomic risk. In chapter 1 I show that expected inflation risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns even after controlling for cash flow growth and volatility risks. Motivated by this evidence I study a long run risk model with a built-in inflation non-neutrality channel that allows me to decompose the real stochastic discount factor into news about current and expected cash flow growth, news about expected inflation and news about volatility. The model can successfully price a broad menu of assets and provides a setting for analyzing cross sectional variation in expected inflation risk premium. For industries like retail and durable goods inflation risk can account for nearly a third of the overall risk premium while the energy industry and a broad commodity index act like inflation hedges. Nominal bonds are exposed to expected inflation risk and have inflation premiums that increase with bond maturity. The price of expected inflation risk was very high during the 70's and 80's, but has come down a lot since being very close to zero over the past decade. On average, the expected inflation price of risk is negative, consistent with the view that periods of high inflation represent a "bad" state of the world and are associated with low economic growth and poor stock market performance. In chapter 2 I look at the way capital markets react to predetermined macroeconomic announcements. I document significantly higher excess returns on the US stock market on macro release dates as compared to days when no macroeconomic news hit the market. Almost the entire equity premium since 1997 is being realized on days when macroeconomic news are released. At high frequency, there is a pattern of returns increasing in the hours prior to the pre-determined announcement time, peaking around the time of the announcement and dropping thereafter.

Institutions, Innovation, and Grassroots Change: Alternatives to Transnational Governance in the Global South

Transnational governance has been advanced as a viable option for regulating commodities produced in emerging economies—where incapable or unwilling states may undersupply institutions requisite for overseeing supply chains consistent with the quality, safety, environmental, or social standards demanded by the global marketplace. Producers from these jurisdictions, otherwise left with few venues for securing market access and price premiums, ostensibly benefit from whatever pathways transnational actors offer to minimize barriers to entry—including voluntary certification for compliance with a panoply of public and private rules, such as those promulgated by NGOs like the Fair Trade Federation or multinational retailers like Wal-Mart. Yet, such transnational “sustainability” governance may neither be effective nor desirable. Regulatory schemes, like third-party certification, often privilege the interests of primary architects and beneficiaries—private business associations, governments, NGOs, and consumers in the global North—over regulatory targets—producers in the global South. Rather than engaging with the international marketplace via imported and externally-driven schemes, some producer groups are instead challenging existing rules and innovating homegrown institutions. These alternatives to commercialization adopt some institutional characteristics of their transnational counterparts yet deliver benefits in a manner more aligned with the needs of producers. Drawing on original empirical cases from Nicaragua and Mexico, this dissertation examines the role of domestic institutional alternatives to transnational governance in enhancing market access, environmental quality and rural livelihoods within producer communities. Unlike the more technocratic and expert-driven approaches characteristic of mainstream governance efforts, these local regulatory institutions build upon the social capital, indigenous identity, “ancestral” knowledge, and human assets of producer communities as new sources of power and legitimacy in governing agricultural commodities.