Burning a hole in the budget: tobacco spending and its crowd-out of other goods.

Smoking is an expensive habit. Smoking households spend, on average, more than $US1000 annually on cigarettes. When a family member quits, in addition to the former smoker's improved long-term health, families benefit because savings from reduced cigarette expenditures can be allocated to other goods. For households in which some members continue to smoke, smoking expenditures crowd-out other purchases, which may affect other household members, as well as the smoker. We empirically analyse how expenditures on tobacco crowd-out consumption of other goods, estimating the patterns of substitution and complementarity between tobacco products and other categories of household expenditure. We use the Consumer Expenditure Survey data for the years 1995-2001, which we complement with regional price data and state cigarette prices. We estimate a consumer demand system that includes several main expenditure categories (cigarettes, food, alcohol, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care) and controls for socioeconomic variables and other sources of observable heterogeneity. Descriptive data indicate that, comparing smokers to nonsmokers, smokers spend less on housing. Results from the demand system indicate that as the price of cigarettes rises, households increase the quantity of food purchased, and, in some samples, reduce the quantity of apparel and housing purchased.

Knowledge and perceptions among overweight and obese employees about lifestyle-related health benefit changes.

We investigated perceptions among overweight and obese state employees about changes to health insurance that were designed to reduce the scope of health benefits for employees who are obese or who smoke. Before implementation of health benefit plan changes, 658 state employees who were overweight (ie, those with a body mass index [BMI] of 25-29.9) or obese (ie, those with a BMI of > or = 30) enrolled in a weight-loss intervention study were asked about their attitudes and beliefs concerning the new benefit plan changes. Thirty-one percent of employees with a measured BMI of 40 or greater self-reported a BMI of less than 40, suggesting they were unaware that their current BMI would place them in a higher-risk benefit plan. More than half of all respondents reported that the new benefit changes would motivate them to make behavioral changes, but fewer than half felt confident in their ability to make changes. Respondents with a BMI of 40 or greater were more likely than respondents in lower BMI categories to oppose the new changes focused on obesity (P < .001). Current smokers were more likely than former smokers and nonsmokers to oppose the new benefit changes focused on tobacco use (P < .01). Participants represented a sample of employees enrolled in a weight-loss study, limiting generalizability to the larger population of state employees. Benefit plan changes that require employees who are obese and smoke to pay more for health care may motivate some, but not all, individuals to change their behaviors. Since confidence to lose weight was lowest among individuals in the highest BMI categories, more-intense intervention options may be needed to achieve desired health behavior changes.

The effect of involuntary job loss on smoking intensity and relapse.

AIMS: To assess the impact of involuntary job loss due to plant closure or layoff on relapse to smoking and smoking intensity among older workers. DESIGN, PARTICIPANTS, SAMPLE: Data come from the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally representative survey of older Americans aged 51-61 in 1991 followed every 2 years beginning in 1992. The 3052 participants who were working at the initial wave and had any history of smoking comprise the main sample. METHODS: Primary outcomes are smoking relapse at wave 2 (1994) among baseline former smokers, and smoking quantity at wave 2 among baseline current smokers. As reported at the wave 2 follow-up, 6.8% of the sample experienced an involuntary job loss between waves 1 and 2. FINDINGS: Older workers have over two times greater odds of relapse subsequent to involuntary job loss than those who did not. Further, those who were current smokers prior to displacement that did not obtain new employment were found to be smoking more cigarettes, on average, post-job loss. CONCLUSIONS: The stress of job loss, along with other significant changes associated with leaving one's job, which would tend to increase cigarette consumption, must outweigh the financial hardship which would tend to reduce consumption. This highlights job loss as an important health risk factor for older smokers.

Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Psychiatric correlates of snuff and chewing tobacco use.

Compared to the association between cigarette smoking and psychiatric disorders, relatively little is known about the relationship between smokeless tobacco use and psychiatric disorders. To identify the psychiatric correlates of smokeless tobacco use, the analysis used a national representative sample from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) wave 1. Smokeless tobacco use was classified as exclusive snuff use, exclusive chewing tobacco, and dual use of both snuff and chewing tobacco at some time in the smokeless tobacco user's life. Lifetime psychiatric disorders were obtained via structured diagnostic interviews. The results show that the prevalence of lifetime exclusive snuff use, exclusive chewing tobacco, and dual use of both snuff and chewing tobacco was 2.16%, 2.52%, and 2.79%, respectively. After controlling for sociodemographic variables and cigarette smoking, the odds of exclusive chewing tobacco in persons with panic disorder and specific phobia were 1.53 and 1.41 times the odds in persons without those disorders, respectively. The odds of exclusive snuff use, exclusive chewing tobacco, and dual use of both products for individuals with alcohol use disorder were 1.97, 2.01, and 2.99 times the odds for those without alcohol use disorder, respectively. Respondents with cannabis use disorder were 1.44 times more likely to use snuff exclusively than those without cannabis use disorder. Respondents with inhalant/solvent use disorder were associated with 3.33 times the odds of exclusive chewing tobacco. In conclusion, this study highlights the specific links of anxiety disorder, alcohol, cannabis, and inhalant/solvent use disorders with different types of smokeless tobacco use.

Empirical measurement of illicit tobacco trade in the Philippines.

Cigarette smuggling reduces the price of cigarettes, thwarts youth access restrictions, reduces government revenue, and undercuts the ability of taxes to reduce consumption. The tobacco industry often opposes increases to tobacco taxes on the claim that greater taxes induce more smuggling. To date, little is known about the magnitude of smuggling in the Philippines. his information is necessary to effectively address illicit trade and to measure the impacts of tax changes and the introduction of secure tax markings on illicit trade. This study employs two gap discrepancy methods to estimate the magnitude of illicit trade in cigarettes for the Philippines between 1994 and 2009. First, domestic consumption is compared with tax-paid sales to measure the consumption of illicit cigarettes. Second, imports recorded by the Philippines are compared with exports to the Philippines by trade partners to measure smuggling. Domestic consumption fell short of tax-paid sales for all survey years. The magnitude of these differences and a comparison with a prevalence survey for 2009 suggest a high level of survey under-reporting of smoking. In the late 1990s and the mid 2000s, the Philippines experienced two sharp declines in trade discrepancies, from a high of $750 million in 1995 to a low of $133.7 million in 2008. Discrepancies composed more than one-third of the domestic market in 1995, but only 10 percent in 2009. Hong Kong, Singapore, and China together account for more than 80 percent of the cumulative discrepancies over the period and 74 percent of the discrepancy in 2009. The presence of large discrepancies supports the need to implement an effective tax marking and tobacco track and trace system to reduce illicit trade and support tax collection. The absence of a relation between tax changes and smuggling suggests that potential increases in the excise tax should not be discouraged by illicit trade. Finally, the identification of specific trade partners as primary sources for illicit trade may facilitate targeted efforts in cooperation with these governments to reduce illicit trade.