Contrasting Models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Reply to Monroe and Mineka (2008)

The authors address the 4 main points in S. M. Monroe and S. Mineka's (2008) comment. First, the authors show that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis includes an etiology and that it is based on a theoretical model with a distinguished history in psychology and psychiatry. Two tenets of this theoretical model are that voluntary (strategic) recollections of the trauma are fragmented and incomplete while involuntary (spontaneous) recollections are vivid and persistent and yield privileged access to traumatic material. Second, the authors describe differences between their model and other cognitive models of PTSD. They argue that these other models share the same 2 tenets as the diagnosis and show that these 2 tenets are largely unsupported by empirical evidence. Third, the authors counter arguments about the strength of the evidence favoring the mnemonic model. Fourth, they show that concerns about the causal role of memory in PTSD are based on views of causality that are generally inappropriate for the explanation of PTSD in the social and biological sciences. © 2008 American Psychological Association.

When a trauma becomes a key to identity: Enhanced integration of trauma memories predicts posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms

The Centrality of Event Scale (CES) measures the extent to which a traumatic memory forms a central component of personnal identity, a turning point in the life story and a reference point for everyday inferences. In two studies, we show that the CES is positively correlated with severity of PTSD symptoms, even when controlling for measures of anxiety, depression, dissociation and self-consciousness. The findings contradict the widespread view that poor integration of the traumatic memory into one's life story is a main cause of PTSD symptoms. Instead, enhanced integration appears to be a key issue. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The centrality of event scale: a measure of integrating a trauma into one's identity and its relation to post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms.

We introduce a new scale that measures how central an event is to a person's identity and life story. For the most stressful or traumatic event in a person's life, the full 20-item Centrality of Event Scale (CES) and the short 7-item scale are reliable (alpha's of .94 and .88, respectively) in a sample of 707 undergraduates. The scale correlates .38 with PTSD symptom severity and .23 with depression. The present findings are discussed in relation to previous work on individual differences related to PTSD symptoms. Possible connections between the CES and measures of maladaptive attributions and rumination are considered along with suggestions for future research.

Fear learning circuitry is biased toward generalization of fear associations in posttraumatic stress disorder.

Fear conditioning is an established model for investigating posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, symptom triggers may vaguely resemble the initial traumatic event, differing on a variety of sensory and affective dimensions. We extended the fear-conditioning model to assess generalization of conditioned fear on fear processing neurocircuitry in PTSD. Military veterans (n=67) consisting of PTSD (n=32) and trauma-exposed comparison (n=35) groups underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging during fear conditioning to a low fear-expressing face while a neutral face was explicitly unreinforced. Stimuli that varied along a neutral-to-fearful continuum were presented before conditioning to assess baseline responses, and after conditioning to assess experience-dependent changes in neural activity. Compared with trauma-exposed controls, PTSD patients exhibited greater post-study memory distortion of the fear-conditioned stimulus toward the stimulus expressing the highest fear intensity. PTSD patients exhibited biased neural activation toward high-intensity stimuli in fusiform gyrus (P<0.02), insula (P<0.001), primary visual cortex (P<0.05), locus coeruleus (P<0.04), thalamus (P<0.01), and at the trend level in inferior frontal gyrus (P=0.07). All regions except fusiform were moderated by childhood trauma. Amygdala-calcarine (P=0.01) and amygdala-thalamus (P=0.06) functional connectivity selectively increased in PTSD patients for high-intensity stimuli after conditioning. In contrast, amygdala-ventromedial prefrontal cortex (P=0.04) connectivity selectively increased in trauma-exposed controls compared with PTSD patients for low-intensity stimuli after conditioning, representing safety learning. In summary, fear generalization in PTSD is biased toward stimuli with higher emotional intensity than the original conditioned-fear stimulus. Functional brain differences provide a putative neurobiological model for fear generalization whereby PTSD symptoms are triggered by threat cues that merely resemble the index trauma.