Facts and Fictions: Feminist Literary Criticism and Cultural Critique, 1968-2012

"Facts and Fictions: Feminist Literary Criticism and Cultural Critique, 1968-2012" is a critical history of the unfolding of feminist literary study in the US academy. It contributes to current scholarly efforts to revisit the 1970s by reconsidering often-repeated narratives about the critical naivety of feminist literary criticism in its initial articulation. As the story now goes, many of the most prominent feminist thinkers of the period engaged in unsophisticated literary analysis by conflating lived social reality with textual representation when they read works of literature as documentary evidence of real life. As a result, the work of these "bad critics," particularly Kate Millett and Andrea Dworkin, has not been fully accounted for in literary critical terms.

This dissertation returns to Dworkin and Millett's work to argue for a different history of feminist literary criticism. Rather than dismiss their work for its conflation of fact and fiction, I pay attention to the complexity at the heart of it, yielding a new perspective on the history and persistence of the struggle to use literary texts for feminist political ends. Dworkin and Millett established the centrality of reality and representation to the feminist canon debates of "the long 1970s," the sex wars of the 1980s, and the more recent feminist turn to memoir. I read these productive periods in feminist literary criticism from 1968 to 2012 through their varied commitment to literary works.

Chapter One begins with Millett, who de-aestheticized male-authored texts to treat patriarchal literature in relation to culture and ideology. Her mode of literary interpretation was so far afield from the established methods of New Criticism that she was not understood as a literary critic. She was repudiated in the feminist literary criticism that followed her and sought sympathetic methods for reading women's writing. In that decade, the subject of Chapter Two, feminist literary critics began to judge texts on the basis of their ability to accurately depict the reality of women's experiences.

Their vision of the relationship between life and fiction shaped arguments about pornography during the sex wars of the 1980s, the subject of Chapter Three. In this context, Dworkin was feminism's "bad critic." I focus on the literary critical elements of Dworkin's theories of pornographic representation and align her with Millett as a miscategorized literary critic. In the decades following the sex wars, many of the key feminist literary critics of the founding generation (including Dworkin, Jane Gallop, Carolyn Heilbrun, and Millett) wrote memoirs that recounted, largely in experiential terms, the history this dissertation examines. Chapter Four considers the story these memoirists told about the rise and fall of feminist literary criticism. I close with an epilogue on the place of literature in a feminist critical enterprise that has shifted toward privileging theory.

When strangers pass: processing of mutual and averted social gaze in the superior temporal sulcus.

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we investigated brain activity evoked by mutual and averted gaze in a compelling and commonly experienced social encounter. Through virtual-reality goggles, subjects viewed a man who walked toward them and shifted his neutral gaze either toward (mutual gaze) or away (averted gaze) from them. Robust activity was evoked in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and fusiform gyrus (FFG). For both conditions, STS activity was strongly right lateralized. Mutual gaze evoked greater activity in the STS than did averted gaze, whereas the FFG responded equivalently to mutual and averted gaze. Thus, we show that the STS is involved in processing social information conveyed by shifts in gaze within an overtly social context. This study extends understanding of the role of the STS in social cognition and social perception by demonstrating that it is highly sensitive to the context in which a human action occurs.

Latent Space and Social Psychological Models of Diffusion

The problem of social diffusion has animated sociological thinking on topics ranging from the spread of an idea, an innovation or a disease, to the foundations of collective behavior and political polarization. While network diffusion has been a productive metaphor, the reality of diffusion processes is often muddier. Ideas and innovations diffuse differently from diseases, but, with a few exceptions, the diffusion of ideas and innovations has been modeled under the same assumptions as the diffusion of disease. In this dissertation, I develop two new diffusion models for "socially meaningful" contagions that address two of the most significant problems with current diffusion models: (1) that contagions can only spread along observed ties, and (2) that contagions do not change as they spread between people. I augment insights from these statistical and simulation models with an analysis of an empirical case of diffusion - the use of enterprise collaboration software in a large technology company. I focus the empirical study on when people abandon innovations, a crucial, and understudied aspect of the diffusion of innovations. Using timestamped posts, I analyze when people abandon software to a high degree of detail.

To address the first problem, I suggest a latent space diffusion model. Rather than treating ties as stable conduits for information, the latent space diffusion model treats ties as random draws from an underlying social space, and simulates diffusion over the social space. Theoretically, the social space model integrates both actor ties and attributes simultaneously in a single social plane, while incorporating schemas into diffusion processes gives an explicit form to the reciprocal influences that cognition and social environment have on each other. Practically, the latent space diffusion model produces statistically consistent diffusion estimates where using the network alone does not, and the diffusion with schemas model shows that introducing some cognitive processing into diffusion processes changes the rate and ultimate distribution of the spreading information. To address the second problem, I suggest a diffusion model with schemas. Rather than treating information as though it is spread without changes, the schema diffusion model allows people to modify information they receive to fit an underlying mental model of the information before they pass the information to others. Combining the latent space models with a schema notion for actors improves our models for social diffusion both theoretically and practically.

The empirical case study focuses on how the changing value of an innovation, introduced by the innovations' network externalities, influences when people abandon the innovation. In it, I find that people are least likely to abandon an innovation when other people in their neighborhood currently use the software as well. The effect is particularly pronounced for supervisors' current use and number of supervisory team members who currently use the software. This case study not only points to an important process in the diffusion of innovation, but also suggests a new approach -- computerized collaboration systems -- to collecting and analyzing data on organizational processes.