Independent beta-arrestin 2 and G protein-mediated pathways for angiotensin II activation of extracellular signal-regulated kinases 1 and 2.

Stimulation of a mutant angiotensin type 1A receptor (DRY/AAY) with angiotensin II (Ang II) or of a wild-type receptor with an Ang II analog ([sarcosine1,Ile4,Ile8]Ang II) fails to activate classical heterotrimeric G protein signaling but does lead to recruitment of beta-arrestin 2-GFP and activation of extracellular signal-regulated kinases 1 and 2 (ERK1/2) (maximum stimulation approximately 50% of wild type). This G protein-independent activation of mitogen-activated protein kinase is abolished by depletion of cellular beta-arrestin 2 but is unaffected by the PKC inhibitor Ro-31-8425. In parallel, stimulation of the wild-type angiotensin type 1A receptor with Ang II robustly stimulates ERK1/2 activation with approximately 60% of the response blocked by the PKC inhibitor (G protein dependent) and the rest of the response blocked by depletion of cellular beta-arrestin 2 by small interfering RNA (beta-arrestin dependent). These findings imply the existence of independent G protein- and beta-arrestin 2-mediated pathways leading to ERK1/2 activation and the existence of distinct "active" conformations of a seven-membrane-spanning receptor coupled to each.

Control of Emi2 activity and stability through Mos-mediated recruitment of PP2A.

Before fertilization, vertebrate eggs are arrested in meiosis II by cytostatic factor (CSF), which holds the anaphase-promoting complex (APC) in an inactive state. It was recently reported that Mos, an integral component of CSF, acts in part by promoting the Rsk-mediated phosphorylation of the APC inhibitor Emi2/Erp1. We report here that Rsk phosphorylation of Emi2 promotes its interaction with the protein phosphatase PP2A. Emi2 residues adjacent to the Rsk phosphorylation site were important for PP2A binding. An Emi2 mutant that retained Rsk phosphorylation but lacked PP2A binding could not be modulated by Mos. PP2A bound to Emi2 acted on two distinct clusters of sites phosphorylated by Cdc2, one responsible for modulating its stability during CSF arrest and one that controls binding to the APC. These findings provide a molecular mechanism for Mos action in promoting CSF arrest and also define an unusual mechanism, whereby protein phosphorylation recruits a phosphatase for dephosphorylation of distinct sites phosphorylated by another kinase.

Signal Improvement and Contrast Enhancement in Magnetic Resonance Imaging

This thesis reports advances in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), with the ultimate goal of improving signal and contrast in biomedical applications. More specifically, novel MRI pulse sequences have been designed to characterize microstructure, enhance signal and contrast in tissue, and image functional processes. In this thesis, rat brain and red bone marrow images are acquired using iMQCs (intermolecular multiple quantum coherences) between spins that are 10 μm to 500 μm apart. As an important application, iMQCs images in different directions can be used for anisotropy mapping. We investigate tissue microstructure by analyzing anisotropy mapping. At the same time, we simulated images expected from rat brain without microstructure. We compare those with experimental results to prove that the dipolar field from the overall shape only has small contributions to the experimental iMQC signal. Besides magnitude of iMQCs, phase of iMQCs should be studied as well. The phase anisotropy maps built by our method can clearly show susceptibility information in kidneys. It may provide meaningful diagnostic information. To deeply study susceptibility, the modified-crazed sequence is developed. Combining phase data of modified-crazed images and phase data of iMQCs images is very promising to construct microstructure maps. Obviously, the phase image in all above techniques needs to be highly-contrasted and clear. To achieve the goal, algorithm tools from Susceptibility-Weighted Imaging (SWI) and Susceptibility Tensor Imaging (STI) stands out superb useful and creative in our system.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.