Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Accessibility, availability and affordability of anti-malarials in a rural district in Kenya after implementation of a national subsidy scheme.

BACKGROUND: Poor access to prompt and effective treatment for malaria contributes to high mortality and severe morbidity. In Kenya, it is estimated that only 12% of children receive anti-malarials for their fever within 24 hours. The first point of care for many fevers is a local medicine retailer, such as a pharmacy or chemist. The role of the medicine retailer as an important distribution point for malaria medicines has been recognized and several different strategies have been used to improve the services that these retailers provide. Despite these efforts, many mothers still purchase ineffective drugs because they are less expensive than effective artemisinin combination therapy (ACT). One strategy that is being piloted in several countries is an international subsidy targeted at anti-malarials supplied through the retail sector. The goal of this strategy is to make ACT as affordable as ineffective alternatives. The programme, called the Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria was rolled out in Kenya in August 2010. METHODS: In December 2010, the affordability and accessibility of malaria medicines in a rural district in Kenya were evaluated using a complete census of all public and private facilities, chemists, pharmacists, and other malaria medicine retailers within the Webuye Demographic Surveillance Area. Availability, types, and prices of anti-malarials were assessed. There are 13 public or mission facilities and 97 medicine retailers (registered and unregistered). RESULTS: The average distance from a home to the nearest public health facility is 2 km, but the average distance to the nearest medicine retailer is half that. Quinine is the most frequently stocked anti-malarial (61% of retailers). More medicine retailers stocked sulphadoxine-pyramethamine (SP; 57%) than ACT (44%). Eleven percent of retailers stocked AMFm subsidized artemether-lumefantrine (AL). No retailers had chloroquine in stock and only five were selling artemisinin monotherapy. The mean price of any brand of AL, the recommended first-line drug in Kenya, was $2.7 USD. Brands purchased under the AMFm programme cost 40% less than non-AMFm brands. Artemisinin monotherapies cost on average more than twice as much as AMFm-brand AL. SP cost only $0.5, a fraction of the price of ACT. CONCLUSIONS: AMFm-subsidized anti-malarials are considerably less expensive than unsubsidized AL, but the price difference between effective and ineffective therapies is still large.

Consumer Behavior and Firm Competition

Understanding consumer behavior is critical for firms' decision making. How consumers make decisions about what they want and buy directly affect the profits of firms. Therefore, it is important to consider consumer behaviors and incorporate them into the model when studying the optimal strategy of firms and competition between firms. In this dissertation, I study rich and interesting consumer behaviors and their impact on firms' strategy in two essays. The first essay considers consumers' shopping cost which leads to their preference for one-stop shopping. I examine how store visit costs and consumer knowledge about a product affect the strategic store choice of consumers and, in turn, the pricing, customer service and advertising decisions of competing retailers. My analysis offers insights on how specialty stores can compete with big-box retailers. In the second essay, I focus on a well-established psychology phenomenon, cognitive dissonance. I incorporate the idea of cognitive dissonance into a model of spatial competition and examine its implications for selling strategy. I provide new insight on the profitability of advance selling and spot selling as well as the pricing of bundle and its components. Collectively, two essays in this dissertation introduce novel ways to model consumer behaviors and help to understand the impact of consumer behaviors on firm profitability and strategy.