Buffer stocks are better stabilizers than quotas

Michael Pelcovits (1979, p. 307) recently showed that with an unstable foreign excess supply curve, either a fixed quota or a buffer stock program with a fixed tariff can be used to stabilize domestic price at a given level, and both policies 'will have the same effect on social welfare [so...t]he choice between [the two...] must then be made on the basis of administrative cost and feasibility'. However, he reached his conclusion by ranking the two policies on the basis of domestic welfare, and in this note we demonstrate with his same model that on the basis of foreign welfare the buffer stock is better than the quota. Thus, world welfre is higher under the buffer stock than under the quota. © 1981.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.

Fishing quota markets

In 1986, New Zealand responded to the open-access problem by establishing the world's largest individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Using a 15-year panel dataset from New Zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas, we assess trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions, consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization. Overall, this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.