Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Amino acid permeases require COPII components and the ER resident membrane protein Shr3p for packaging into transport vesicles in vitro.

In S. cerevisiae lacking SHR3, amino acid permeases specifically accumulate in membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) and fail to be transported to the plasma membrane. We examined the requirements of transport of the permeases from the ER to the Golgi in vitro. Addition of soluble COPII components (Sec23/24p, Sec13/31p, and Sar1p) to yeast membrane preparations generated vesicles containing the general amino acid permease. Gap1p, and the histidine permease, Hip1p. Shr3p was required for the packaging of Gap1p and Hip1p but was not itself incorporated into transport vesicles. In contrast, the packaging of the plasma membrane ATPase, Pma1p, and the soluble yeast pheromone precursor, glycosylated pro alpha factor, was independent of Shr3p. In addition, we show that integral membrane and soluble cargo colocalize in transport vesicles, indicating that different types of cargo are not segregated at an early step in secretion. Our data suggest that specific ancillary proteins in the ER membrane recruit subsets of integral membrane protein cargo into COPII transport vesicles.