Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Improving supply chain performance: Real-time demand information and flexible deliveries

In some supply chains, materials are ordered periodically according to local information. This paper investigates how to improve the performance of such a supply chain. Specifically, we consider a serial inventory system in which each stage implements a local reorder interval policy; i.e., each stage orders up to a local basestock level according to a fixed-interval schedule. A fixed cost is incurred for placing an order. Two improvement strategies are considered: (1) expanding the information flow by acquiring real-time demand information and (2) accelerating the material flow via flexible deliveries. The first strategy leads to a reorder interval policy with full information; the second strategy leads to a reorder point policy with local information. Both policies have been studied in the literature. Thus, to assess the benefit of these strategies, we analyze the local reorder interval policy. We develop a bottom-up recursion to evaluate the system cost and provide a method to obtain the optimal policy. A numerical study shows the following: Increasing the flexibility of deliveries lowers costs more than does expanding information flow; the fixed order costs and the system lead times are key drivers that determine the effectiveness of these improvement strategies. In addition, we find that using optimal batch sizes in the reorder point policy and demand rate to infer reorder intervals may lead to significant cost inefficiency. © 2010 INFORMS.

A COMPARISON OF MARKET CLEARING TOOLS IN ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS

To maintain a strict balance between demand and supply in the US power systems, the Independent System Operators (ISOs) schedule power plants and determine electricity prices using a market clearing model. This model determines for each time period and power plant, the times of startup, shutdown, the amount of power production, and the provisioning of spinning and non-spinning power generation reserves, etc. Such a deterministic optimization model takes as input the characteristics of all the generating units such as their power generation installed capacity, ramp rates, minimum up and down time requirements, and marginal costs for production, as well as the forecast of intermittent energy such as wind and solar, along with the minimum reserve requirement of the whole system. This reserve requirement is determined based on the likelihood of outages on the supply side and on the levels of error forecasts in demand and intermittent generation. With increased installed capacity of intermittent renewable energy, determining the appropriate level of reserve requirements has become harder. Stochastic market clearing models have been proposed as an alternative to deterministic market clearing models. Rather than using a fixed reserve targets as an input, stochastic market clearing models take different scenarios of wind power into consideration and determine reserves schedule as output. Using a scaled version of the power generation system of PJM, a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia, and wind scenarios generated from BPA (Bonneville Power Administration) data, this paper explores a comparison of the performance between a stochastic and deterministic model in market clearing. The two models are compared in their ability to contribute to the affordability, reliability and sustainability of the electricity system, measured in terms of total operational costs, load shedding and air emissions. The process of building the models and running for tests indicate that a fair comparison is difficult to obtain due to the multi-dimensional performance metrics considered here, and the difficulty in setting up the parameters of the models in a way that does not advantage or disadvantage one modeling framework. Along these lines, this study explores the effect that model assumptions such as reserve requirements, value of lost load (VOLL) and wind spillage costs have on the comparison of the performance of stochastic vs deterministic market clearing models.