Returns to R&D on new drug introductions in the 1980s.

This study finds that the mean IRR for 1980-84 U.S. new drug introductions is 11.1%, and the mean NPV is 22 million (1990 dollars). The distribution of returns is highly skewed. The results are robust to plausible changes in the baseline assumptions. Our work is also compared with a 1993 study by the OTA. Despite some important differences in assumptions, both studies imply that returns for the average NCE are within one percentage point of the industry's cost of capital. This is much less than what is typically observed in analyses based on accounting data.

Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New estimates of R&D costs.

The research and development costs of 106 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug and biologics development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per approved new compound is $1395 million (2013 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 10.5% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of $2558 million (2013 dollars). When compared to the results of the previous study in this series, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 8.5% above general price inflation. Adding an estimate of post-approval R&D costs increases the cost estimate to $2870 million (2013 dollars).

The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: Is biotech different?

The costs of developing the types of new drugs that have been pursued by traditional pharmaceutical firms have been estimated in a number of studies. However, similar analyses have not been published on the costs of developing the types of molecules on which biotech firms have focused. This study represents a first attempt to get a sense for the magnitude of the R&D costs associated with the discovery and development of new therapeutic biopharmaceuticals (specifically, recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies [mAbs]). We utilize drug-specific data on cash outlays, development times, and success in obtaining regulatory marketing approval to estimate the average pre-tax R&D resource cost for biopharmaceuticals up to the point of initial US marketing approval (in year 2005 dollars). We found average out-of-pocket (cash outlay) cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $198 million, $361 million, and $559 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Including the time costs associated with biopharmaceutical R&D, we found average capitalized cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $615 million, $626 million, and $1241 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Adjusting previously published estimates of R&D costs for traditional pharmaceutical firms by using past growth rates for pharmaceutical company costs to correspond to the more recent period to which our biopharmaceutical data apply, we found that total out-of-pocket cost per approved biopharmaceutical was somewhat lower than for the pharmaceutical company data ($559 million vs $672 million). However, estimated total capitalized cost per approved new molecule was nearly the same for biopharmaceuticals as for the adjusted pharmaceutical company data ($1241 million versus $1318 million). The results should be viewed with some caution for now given a limited number of biopharmaceutical molecules with data on cash outlays, different therapeutic class distributions for biopharmaceuticals and for pharmaceutical company drugs, and uncertainty about whether recent growth rates in pharmaceutical company costs are different from immediate past growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Where does energy R&D come from? Examining crowding out from energy R&D

Recent efforts to endogenize technological change in climate policy models demonstrate the importance of accounting for the opportunity cost of climate R&D investments. Because the social returns to R&D investments are typically higher than the social returns to other types of investment, any new climate mitigation R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D investment may dampen the overall gains from induced technological change. Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work to guide modelers as to the potential magnitude of such crowding out effects. This paper considers both the private and social opportunity costs of climate R&D. Addressing private costs, we ask whether an increase in climate R&D represents new R&D spending, or whether some (or all) of the additional climate R&D comes at the expense of other R&D. Addressing social costs, we use patent citations to compare the social value of alternative energy research to other types of R&D that may be crowded out. Beginning at the industry level, we find no evidence of crowding out across sectors-that is, increases in energy R&D do not draw R&D resources away from sectors that do not perform R&D. Given this, we proceed with a detailed look at alternative energy R&D. Linking patent data and financial data by firm, we ask whether an increase in alternative energy patents leads to a decrease in other types of patenting activity. While we find that increases in alternative energy patents do result in fewer patents of other types, the evidence suggests that this is due to profit-maximizing changes in research effort, rather than financial constraints that limit the total amount of R&D possible. Finally, we use patent citation data to compare the social value of alternative energy patents to other patents by these firms. Alternative energy patents are cited more frequently, and by a wider range of other technologies, than other patents by these firms, suggesting that their social value is higher. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

R&D Costs and Returns to New Drug Development: A Review of the Evidence

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article reviews the extensive literature on R&D costs and returns. The first section focuses on R&D costs and the various factors that have affected the trends in real R&D costs over time. The second section considers economic studies on the distribution of returns in pharmaceuticals for different cohorts of new drug introductions. It also reviews the use of these studies to analyze the impact of policy actions on R&D costs and returns. The final section concludes and discusses open questions for further research.

Expert assessments of retrofitting coal-fired power plants with carbon dioxide capture technologies

A set of 13 US based experts in post-combustion and oxy-fuel combustion CO2 capture systems responded to an extensive questionnaire asking their views on the present status and future expected performance and costs for amine-based, chilled ammonia, and oxy-combustion retrofits of coal-fired power plants. This paper presents the experts' responses for technology maturity, ideal plant characteristics for early adopters, and the extent to which R&D and deployment incentives will impact costs. It also presents the best estimates and 95% confidence limits of the energy penalties associated with amine-based systems. The results show a general consensus that amine-based systems are closer to commercial application, but potential for improving performance and lowering costs is limited; chilled ammonia and oxy-combustion offer greater potential for cost reductions, but not without greater uncertainty regarding scale and technical feasibility. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.

Water exchange rates of water-soluble manganese(III) porphyrins of therapeutical potential.

The activation parameters and the rate constants of the water-exchange reactions of Mn(III)TE-2-PyP(5+) (meso-tetrakis(N-ethylpyridinium-2-yl)porphyrin) as cationic, Mn(III)TnHex-2-PyP(5+) (meso-tetrakis(N-n-hexylpyridinium-2-yl)porphyrin) as sterically shielded cationic, and Mn(III)TSPP(3-) (meso-tetrakis(4-sulfonatophenyl)porphyrin) as anionic manganese(iii) porphyrins were determined from the temperature dependence of (17)O NMR relaxation rates. The rate constants at 298 K were obtained as 4.12 x 10(6) s(-1), 5.73 x 10(6) s(-1), and 2.74 x 10(7) s(-1), respectively. On the basis of the determined entropies of activation, an interchange-dissociative mechanism (I(d)) was proposed for the cationic complexes (DeltaS(double dagger) = approximately 0 J mol(-1) K(-1)) whereas a limiting dissociative mechanism (D) was proposed for Mn(III)TSPP(3-) complex (DeltaS(double dagger) = +79 J mol(-1) K(-1)). The obtained water exchange rate of Mn(III)TSPP(3-) corresponded well to the previously assumed value used by Koenig et al. (S. H. Koenig, R. D. Brown and M. Spiller, Magn. Reson. Med., 1987, 4, 52-260) to simulate the (1)H NMRD curves, therefore the measured value supports the theory developed for explaining the anomalous relaxivity of Mn(III)TSPP(3-) complex. A magnitude of the obtained water-exchange rate constants further confirms the suggested inner sphere electron transfer mechanism for the reactions of the two positively charged Mn(iii) porphyrins with the various biologically important oxygen and nitrogen reactive species. Due to the high biological and clinical relevance of the reactions that occur at the metal site of the studied Mn(iii) porphyrins, the determination of water exchange rates advanced our insight into their efficacy and mechanism of action, and in turn should impact their further development for both diagnostic (imaging) and therapeutic purposes.

Impact of economic, regulatory, and patent policies on innovation in cancer chemoprevention.

Chemoprevention agents are an emerging new scientific area that holds out the promise of delaying or avoiding a number of common cancers. These new agents face significant scientific, regulatory, and economic barriers, however, which have limited investment in their research and development (R&D). These barriers include above-average clinical trial scales, lengthy time frames between discovery and Food and Drug Administration approval, liability risks (because they are given to healthy individuals), and a growing funding gap for early-stage candidates. The longer time frames and risks associated with chemoprevention also cause exclusivity time on core patents to be limited or subject to significant uncertainties. We conclude that chemoprevention uniquely challenges the structure of incentives embodied in the economic, regulatory, and patent policies for the biopharmaceutical industry. Many of these policy issues are illustrated by the recently Food and Drug Administration-approved preventive agents Gardasil and raloxifene. Our recommendations to increase R&D investment in chemoprevention agents include (a) increased data exclusivity times on new biological and chemical drugs to compensate for longer gestation periods and increasing R&D costs; chemoprevention is at the far end of the distribution in this regard; (b) policies such as early-stage research grants and clinical development tax credits targeted specifically to chemoprevention agents (these are policies that have been very successful in increasing R&D investment for orphan drugs); and (c) a no-fault liability insurance program like that currently in place for children's vaccines.

Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation

We assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting innovation and diffusion of renewable energy. We evaluate the relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions reduction, efficiency, and other outcomes. We also assess how the nature of technological progress through learning and research and development (R&D), and the degree of knowledge spillovers, affects the desirability of different policies. Due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy involves a portfolio of different instruments targeted at emissions, learning, and R&D. Although the relative cost of individual policies in achieving reductions depends on parameter values and the emissions target, in a numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, the ranking is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies achieves emissions reductions at a significantly lower cost than any single policy. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Modeling endogenous technological change for climate policy analysis

The approach used to model technological change in a climate policy model is a critical determinant of its results in terms of the time path of CO2 prices and costs required to achieve various emission reduction goals. We provide an overview of the different approaches used in the literature, with an emphasis on recent developments regarding endogenous technological change, research and development, and learning. Detailed examination sheds light on the salient features of each approach, including strengths, limitations, and policy implications. Key issues include proper accounting for the opportunity costs of climate-related knowledge generation, treatment of knowledge spillovers and appropriability, and the empirical basis for parameterizing technological relationships. No single approach appears to dominate on all these dimensions, and different approaches may be preferred depending on the purpose of the analysis, be it positive or normative. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The distribution of sales revenues from pharmaceutical innovation.

OBJECTIVE: This report updates our earlier work on the returns to pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) in the US (1980 to 1984), which showed that the returns distributions are highly skewed. It evaluates a more recent cohort of new drug introductions in the US (1988 to 1992) and examines how the returns distribution is emerging for drugs with life cycles concentrated in the 1990s versus the 1980s. DESIGN AND SETTING: Methods were described in detail in our earlier reports. The current sample included 110 new drug entities (including 28 orphan drugs), and sales data were obtained for the period 1988 to 1998, which represented between 7 and 11 years of sales for the drugs included. 20 years was chosen as the expected market life for this cohort, and a 2-step procedure was used to project future sales for the drugs--during the period until patent expiry and then beyond patent expiry until the 20-year time-horizon was completed. Thus, the values in the first half of the life cycle are essentially based on realised sales, while those in the second half are projected using information on patent expiry and other inputs. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES AND RESULTS: Peak annual sales for the top decile of drugs introduced between 1988 and 1992 in the US amounted to almost $US1.1 billion compared with peak sales of less than $US175 million (1992 values) for the mean compound. In particular, the top decile accounted for 56% of overall sales revenue. Although the sales distributions were skewed in both our earlier and current analysis, the top decile in the later time-period exhibited more rapid rates of growth after launch, a peak that was more than 50% greater in real terms than for the 1980 to 1984 cohort, and a faster rate of expected decline in sales after patent expiry. One factor contributing to the distribution of sales revenues becoming more skewed over time is the orphan drug phenomenon (i.e. most of the orphan drugs are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution). CONCLUSION: The distribution of sales revenues for new drug compounds is highly skewed in nature. In this regard, the top decile of new drugs accounts for more than half of the total sales generated by the 1988 to 1992 cohort analysed. Furthermore, the distribution of sales revenues for this cohort is more skewed than that of the 1980 to 1984 cohort we analysed in previous research.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article considers the determinants and effects of M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, with a particular focus on innovation and R&D productivity. As is the case in other industries, mergers in the pharmaceutical field are driven by a variety of company motives and conditions. These include defensive responses to industry shocks as well as more proactive rationales, such as economies of scale and scope, access to new technologies, and expansion to new markets. It is important to take account of firms' characteristics and motivations in evaluating merger performance, rather than using a broad aggregate brushstroke. Research to date on pharmaceuticals suggests considerable variation in both motivation and outcomes. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the larger horizontal mergers in pharmaceuticals have run into few challenges from regulatory authorities in the United States and the European Union, given the option to spin off competing therapeutic products to other drug firms.

Genomics research: world survey of public funding.

BACKGROUND: Over the past two decades, genomics has evolved as a scientific research discipline. Genomics research was fueled initially by government and nonprofit funding sources, later augmented by private research and development (R&D) funding. Citizens and taxpayers of many countries have funded much of the research, and have expectations about access to the resulting information and knowledge. While access to knowledge gained from all publicly funded research is desired, access is especially important for fields that have broad social impact and stimulate public dialogue. Genomics is one such field, where public concerns are raised for reasons such as health care and insurance implications, as well as personal and ancestral identification. Thus, genomics has grown rapidly as a field, and attracts considerable interest. RESULTS: One way to study the growth of a field of research is to examine its funding. This study focuses on public funding of genomics research, identifying and collecting data from major government and nonprofit organizations around the world, and updating previous estimates of world genomics research funding, including information about geographical origins. We initially identified 89 publicly funded organizations; we requested information about each organization's funding of genomics research. Of these organizations, 48 responded and 34 reported genomics research expenditures (of those that responded but did not supply information, some did not fund such research, others could not quantify it). The figures reported here include all the largest funders and we estimate that we have accounted for most of the genomics research funding from government and nonprofit sources. CONCLUSION: Aggregate spending on genomics research from 34 funding sources averaged around $2.9 billion in 2003-2006. The United States spent more than any other country on genomics research, corresponding to 35% of the overall worldwide public funding (compared to 49% US share of public health research funding for all purposes). When adjusted to genomics funding intensity, however, the United States dropped below Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada, as measured both by genomics research expenditure per capita and per Gross Domestic Product.

New business models for antibiotic innovation.

The increase in antibiotic resistance and the dearth of novel antibiotics have become a growing concern among policy-makers. A combination of financial, scientific, and regulatory challenges poses barriers to antibiotic innovation. However, each of these three challenges provides an opportunity to develop pathways for new business models to bring novel antibiotics to market. Pull-incentives that pay for the outputs of research and development (R&D) and push-incentives that pay for the inputs of R&D can be used to increase innovation for antibiotics. Financial incentives might be structured to promote delinkage of a company's return on investment from revenues of antibiotics. This delinkage strategy might not only increase innovation, but also reinforce rational use of antibiotics. Regulatory approval, however, should not and need not compromise safety and efficacy standards to bring antibiotics with novel mechanisms of action to market. Instead regulatory agencies could encourage development of companion diagnostics, test antibiotic combinations in parallel, and pool and make transparent clinical trial data to lower R&D costs. A tax on non-human use of antibiotics might also create a disincentive for non-therapeutic use of these drugs. Finally, the new business model for antibiotic innovation should apply the 3Rs strategy for encouraging collaborative approaches to R&D in innovating novel antibiotics: sharing resources, risks, and rewards.