Carbon mitigation costs for the commercial building sector: Discrete-continuous choice analysis of multifuel energy demand

We estimate a carbon mitigation cost curve for the U.S. commercial sector based on econometric estimation of the responsiveness of fuel demand and equipment choices to energy price changes. The model econometrically estimates fuel demand conditional on fuel choice, which is characterized by a multinomial logit model. Separate estimation of end uses (e.g., heating, cooking) using the U.S. Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey allows for exceptionally detailed estimation of price responsiveness disaggregated by end use and fuel type. We then construct aggregate long-run elasticities, by fuel type, through a series of simulations; own-price elasticities range from -0.9 for district heat services to -2.9 for fuel oil. The simulations form the basis of a marginal cost curve for carbon mitigation, which suggests that a price of $20 per ton of carbon would result in an 8% reduction in commercial carbon emissions, and a price of $100 per ton would result in a 28% reduction. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Gold mining in the Peruvian Amazon: global prices, deforestation, and mercury imports.

Many factors such as poverty, ineffective institutions and environmental regulations may prevent developing countries from managing how natural resources are extracted to meet a strong market demand. Extraction for some resources has reached such proportions that evidence is measurable from space. We present recent evidence of the global demand for a single commodity and the ecosystem destruction resulting from commodity extraction, recorded by satellites for one of the most biodiverse areas of the world. We find that since 2003, recent mining deforestation in Madre de Dios, Peru is increasing nonlinearly alongside a constant annual rate of increase in international gold price (∼18%/yr). We detect that the new pattern of mining deforestation (1915 ha/year, 2006-2009) is outpacing that of nearby settlement deforestation. We show that gold price is linked with exponential increases in Peruvian national mercury imports over time (R(2) = 0.93, p = 0.04, 2003-2009). Given the past rates of increase we predict that mercury imports may more than double for 2011 (∼500 t/year). Virtually all of Peru's mercury imports are used in artisanal gold mining. Much of the mining increase is unregulated/artisanal in nature, lacking environmental impact analysis or miner education. As a result, large quantities of mercury are being released into the atmosphere, sediments and waterways. Other developing countries endowed with gold deposits are likely experiencing similar environmental destruction in response to recent record high gold prices. The increasing availability of satellite imagery ought to evoke further studies linking economic variables with land use and cover changes on the ground.

Inhibition-Induced Forgetting Results from Resource Competition between Response Inhibition and Memory Encoding Processes.

UNLABELLED: Response inhibition is a key component of executive control, but its relation to other cognitive processes is not well understood. We recently documented the "inhibition-induced forgetting effect": no-go cues are remembered more poorly than go cues. We attributed this effect to central-resource competition, whereby response inhibition saps attention away from memory encoding. However, this proposal is difficult to test with behavioral means alone. We therefore used fMRI in humans to test two neural predictions of the "common resource hypothesis": (1) brain regions associated with response inhibition should exhibit greater resource demands during encoding of subsequently forgotten than remembered no-go cues; and (2) this higher inhibitory resource demand should lead to memory encoding regions having less resources available during encoding of subsequently forgotten no-go cues. Participants categorized face stimuli by gender in a go/no-go task and, following a delay, performed a surprise recognition memory test for those faces. Replicating previous findings, memory was worse for no-go than for go stimuli. Crucially, forgetting of no-go cues was predicted by high inhibitory resource demand, as quantified by the trial-by-trial ratio of activity in neural "no-go" versus "go" networks. Moreover, this index of inhibitory demand exhibited an inverse trial-by-trial relationship with activity in brain regions responsible for the encoding of no-go cues into memory, notably the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. This seesaw pattern between the neural resource demand of response inhibition and activity related to memory encoding directly supports the hypothesis that response inhibition temporarily saps attentional resources away from stimulus processing. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Recent behavioral experiments showed that inhibiting a motor response to a stimulus (a "no-go cue") impairs subsequent memory for that cue. Here, we used fMRI to test whether this "inhibition-induced forgetting effect" is caused by competition for neural resources between the processes of response inhibition and memory encoding. We found that trial-by-trial variations in neural inhibitory resource demand predicted subsequent forgetting of no-go cues and that higher inhibitory demand was furthermore associated with lower concurrent activation in brain regions responsible for successful memory encoding of no-go cues. Thus, motor inhibition and stimulus encoding appear to compete with each other: when more resources have to be devoted to inhibiting action, less are available for encoding sensory stimuli.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Essays on Energy Economics and Industrial Organization

The dissertation consists of three chapters related to the low-price guarantee marketing strategy and energy efficiency analysis. The low-price guarantee is a marketing strategy in which firms promise to charge consumers the lowest price among their competitors. Chapter 1 addresses the research question "Does a Low-Price Guarantee Induce Lower Prices'' by looking into the retail gasoline industry in Quebec where there was a major branded firm which started a low-price guarantee back in 1996. Chapter 2 does a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to drive police indications and offers a new explanation of the firms' incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Chapter 3 develops the energy performance indicators (EPIs) to measure energy efficiency of the manufacturing plants in pulp, paper and paperboard industry.

Chapter 1 revisits the traditional view that a low-price guarantee results in higher prices by facilitating collusion. Using accurate market definitions and station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I conducted a descriptive analysis based on stations and price zones to compare the price and sales movement before and after the guarantee was adopted. I find that, contrary to the traditional view, the stores that offered the guarantee significantly decreased their prices and increased their sales. I also build a difference-in-difference model to quantify the decrease in posted price of the stores that offered the guarantee to be 0.7 cents per liter. While this change is significant, I do not find the response in comeptitors' prices to be significant. The sales of the stores that offered the guarantee increased significantly while the competitors' sales decreased significantly. However, the significance vanishes if I use the station clustered standard errors. Comparing my observations and the predictions of different theories of modeling low-price guarantees, I conclude the empirical evidence here supports that the low-price guarantee is a simple commitment device and induces lower prices.

Chapter 2 conducts a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to address the antitrust concerns and potential regulations from the government; explains the firms' potential incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Using station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I estimated consumers' demand of gasoline by a structural model with spatial competition incorporating the low-price guarantee as a commitment device, which allows firms to pre-commit to charge the lowest price among their competitors. The counterfactual analysis under the Bertrand competition setting shows that the stores that offered the guarantee attracted a lot more consumers and decreased their posted price by 0.6 cents per liter. Although the matching stores suffered a decrease in profits from gasoline sales, they are incentivized to adopt the low-price guarantee to attract more consumers to visit the store likely increasing profits at attached convenience stores. Firms have strong incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee on the product that their consumers are most price-sensitive about, while earning a profit from the products that are not covered in the guarantee. I estimate that consumers earn about 0.3% more surplus when the low-price guarantee is in place, which suggests that the authorities should not be concerned and regulate low-price guarantees. In Appendix B, I also propose an empirical model to look into how low-price guarantees would change consumer search behavior and whether consumer search plays an important role in estimating consumer surplus accurately.

Chapter 3, joint with Gale Boyd, describes work with the pulp, paper, and paperboard (PP&PB) industry to provide a plant-level indicator of energy efficiency for facilities that produce various types of paper products in the United States. Organizations that implement strategic energy management programs undertake a set of activities that, if carried out properly, have the potential to deliver sustained energy savings. Energy performance benchmarking is a key activity of strategic energy management and one way to enable companies to set energy efficiency targets for manufacturing facilities. The opportunity to assess plant energy performance through a comparison with similar plants in its industry is a highly desirable and strategic method of benchmarking for industrial energy managers. However, access to energy performance data for conducting industry benchmarking is usually unavailable to most industrial energy managers. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through its ENERGY STAR program, seeks to overcome this barrier through the development of manufacturing sector-based plant energy performance indicators (EPIs) that encourage U.S. industries to use energy more efficiently. In the development of the energy performance indicator tools, consideration is given to the role that performance-based indicators play in motivating change; the steps necessary for indicator development, from interacting with an industry in securing adequate data for the indicator; and actual application and use of an indicator when complete. How indicators are employed in EPA’s efforts to encourage industries to voluntarily improve their use of energy is discussed as well. The chapter describes the data and statistical methods used to construct the EPI for plants within selected segments of the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry: specifically pulp mills and integrated paper & paperboard mills. The individual equations are presented, as are the instructions for using those equations as implemented in an associated Microsoft Excel-based spreadsheet tool.