Buffer stocks are better stabilizers than quotas

Michael Pelcovits (1979, p. 307) recently showed that with an unstable foreign excess supply curve, either a fixed quota or a buffer stock program with a fixed tariff can be used to stabilize domestic price at a given level, and both policies 'will have the same effect on social welfare [so...t]he choice between [the two...] must then be made on the basis of administrative cost and feasibility'. However, he reached his conclusion by ranking the two policies on the basis of domestic welfare, and in this note we demonstrate with his same model that on the basis of foreign welfare the buffer stock is better than the quota. Thus, world welfre is higher under the buffer stock than under the quota. © 1981.

On the functional relationship between tariffs and welfare

This paper uses a model of trade in two commodities between two countries to establish the following proposition. If the foreign offer curve has no points of inflection and if for each home rate of duty the equilibrium most favorable to the home country is selected (or else there is only one equilibrium), then as the rate of duty increases from zero, home welfare first rises then declines while foreign welfare steadily falls. © 1975.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.