Making Good Citizens: Policy Approaches to Increasing Civic Participation

In this dissertation, I explore the impact of several public policies on civic participation. Using a unique combination of school administrative and public–use voter files and methods for causal inference, I evaluate the impact of three new, as of yet unexplored, policies: one informational, one institutional, and one skill–based. Chapter 2 examines the causal effect of No Child Left Behind’s performance-based accountability school failure signals on turnout in school board elections and on individuals’ use of exit. I find that failure signals mobilize citizens both at the ballot box and by encouraging them to vote with their feet. However, these increases in voice and exit come primarily from citizens who already active—thus exacerbating inequalities in both forms of participation. Chapter 3 examines the causal effect of preregistration—an electoral reform that allows young citizens to enroll in the electoral system before turning 18, while also providing them with various in-school supports. Using data from the Current Population Survey and Florida Voter Files and multiple methods for causal inference, I (with my coauthor listed below) show that preregistration mobilizes and does so for a diverse set of citizens. Finally, Chapter 4 examines the impact of psychosocial or so called non-cognitive skills on voter turnout. Using information from the Fast Track intervention, I show that early– childhood investments in psychosocial skills have large, long-run spillovers on civic participation. These gains are widely distributed, being especially large for those least likely to participate. These chapters provide clear insights that reach across disciplinary boundaries and speak to current policy debates. In placing specific attention not only on whether these programs mobilize, but also on who they mobilize, I provide scholars and practitioners with new ways of thinking about how to address stubbornly low and unequal rates of citizen engagement.

Essays on Energy Economics and Industrial Organization

The dissertation consists of three chapters related to the low-price guarantee marketing strategy and energy efficiency analysis. The low-price guarantee is a marketing strategy in which firms promise to charge consumers the lowest price among their competitors. Chapter 1 addresses the research question "Does a Low-Price Guarantee Induce Lower Prices'' by looking into the retail gasoline industry in Quebec where there was a major branded firm which started a low-price guarantee back in 1996. Chapter 2 does a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to drive police indications and offers a new explanation of the firms' incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Chapter 3 develops the energy performance indicators (EPIs) to measure energy efficiency of the manufacturing plants in pulp, paper and paperboard industry.

Chapter 1 revisits the traditional view that a low-price guarantee results in higher prices by facilitating collusion. Using accurate market definitions and station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I conducted a descriptive analysis based on stations and price zones to compare the price and sales movement before and after the guarantee was adopted. I find that, contrary to the traditional view, the stores that offered the guarantee significantly decreased their prices and increased their sales. I also build a difference-in-difference model to quantify the decrease in posted price of the stores that offered the guarantee to be 0.7 cents per liter. While this change is significant, I do not find the response in comeptitors' prices to be significant. The sales of the stores that offered the guarantee increased significantly while the competitors' sales decreased significantly. However, the significance vanishes if I use the station clustered standard errors. Comparing my observations and the predictions of different theories of modeling low-price guarantees, I conclude the empirical evidence here supports that the low-price guarantee is a simple commitment device and induces lower prices.

Chapter 2 conducts a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to address the antitrust concerns and potential regulations from the government; explains the firms' potential incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Using station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I estimated consumers' demand of gasoline by a structural model with spatial competition incorporating the low-price guarantee as a commitment device, which allows firms to pre-commit to charge the lowest price among their competitors. The counterfactual analysis under the Bertrand competition setting shows that the stores that offered the guarantee attracted a lot more consumers and decreased their posted price by 0.6 cents per liter. Although the matching stores suffered a decrease in profits from gasoline sales, they are incentivized to adopt the low-price guarantee to attract more consumers to visit the store likely increasing profits at attached convenience stores. Firms have strong incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee on the product that their consumers are most price-sensitive about, while earning a profit from the products that are not covered in the guarantee. I estimate that consumers earn about 0.3% more surplus when the low-price guarantee is in place, which suggests that the authorities should not be concerned and regulate low-price guarantees. In Appendix B, I also propose an empirical model to look into how low-price guarantees would change consumer search behavior and whether consumer search plays an important role in estimating consumer surplus accurately.

Chapter 3, joint with Gale Boyd, describes work with the pulp, paper, and paperboard (PP&PB) industry to provide a plant-level indicator of energy efficiency for facilities that produce various types of paper products in the United States. Organizations that implement strategic energy management programs undertake a set of activities that, if carried out properly, have the potential to deliver sustained energy savings. Energy performance benchmarking is a key activity of strategic energy management and one way to enable companies to set energy efficiency targets for manufacturing facilities. The opportunity to assess plant energy performance through a comparison with similar plants in its industry is a highly desirable and strategic method of benchmarking for industrial energy managers. However, access to energy performance data for conducting industry benchmarking is usually unavailable to most industrial energy managers. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through its ENERGY STAR program, seeks to overcome this barrier through the development of manufacturing sector-based plant energy performance indicators (EPIs) that encourage U.S. industries to use energy more efficiently. In the development of the energy performance indicator tools, consideration is given to the role that performance-based indicators play in motivating change; the steps necessary for indicator development, from interacting with an industry in securing adequate data for the indicator; and actual application and use of an indicator when complete. How indicators are employed in EPA’s efforts to encourage industries to voluntarily improve their use of energy is discussed as well. The chapter describes the data and statistical methods used to construct the EPI for plants within selected segments of the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry: specifically pulp mills and integrated paper & paperboard mills. The individual equations are presented, as are the instructions for using those equations as implemented in an associated Microsoft Excel-based spreadsheet tool.

Emulsion-Based RIR-MAPLE Deposition of Conjugated Polymers: Primary Solvent Effect and Its Implications on Organic Solar Cell Performance.

Emulsion-based, resonant infrared matrix-assisted pulsed laser evaporation (RIR-MAPLE) has been demonstrated as an alternative technique to deposit conjugated polymer films for photovoltaic applications; yet, a fundamental understanding of how the emulsion target characteristics translate into film properties and solar cell performance is unclear. Such understanding is crucial to enable the rational improvement of organic solar cell (OSC) efficiency and to realize the expected advantages of emulsion-based RIR-MAPLE for OSC fabrication. In this paper, the effect of the primary solvent used in the emulsion target is studied, both experimentally and theoretically, and it is found to determine the conjugated polymer cluster size in the emulsion as well as surface roughness and internal morphology of resulting polymer films. By using a primary solvent with low solubility-in-water and low vapor pressure, the surface roughness of deposited P3HT and PCPDTBT polymer films was reduced to 10 nm, and the efficiency of P3HT:PC61BM OSCs was increased to 3.2% (∼100 times higher compared to the first MAPLE OSC demonstration [ Caricato , A. P. ; Appl. Phys. Lett. 2012 , 100 , 073306 ]). This work unveils the mechanism of polymer film formation using emulsion-based RIR-MAPLE and provides insight and direction to determine the best ways to take advantage of the emulsion target approach to control film properties for different applications.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.