Spatial Relationships among Hydroacoustic, Hydrographic and Top Predator Patterns: Cetacean Distributions in the Mid-Atlantic Bight

Effective conservation and management of top predators requires a comprehensive understanding of their distributions and of the underlying biological and physical processes that affect these distributions. The Mid-Atlantic Bight shelf break system is a dynamic and productive region where at least 32 species of cetaceans have been recorded through various systematic and opportunistic marine mammal surveys from the 1970s through 2012. My dissertation characterizes the spatial distribution and habitat of cetaceans in the Mid-Atlantic Bight shelf break system by utilizing marine mammal line-transect survey data, synoptic multi-frequency active acoustic data, and fine-scale hydrographic data collected during the 2011 summer Atlantic Marine Assessment Program for Protected Species (AMAPPS) survey. Although studies describing cetacean habitat and distributions have been previously conducted in the Mid-Atlantic Bight, my research specifically focuses on the shelf break region to elucidate both the physical and biological processes that influence cetacean distribution patterns within this cetacean hotspot.

In Chapter One I review biologically important areas for cetaceans in the Atlantic waters of the United States. I describe the study area, the shelf break region of the Mid-Atlantic Bight, in terms of the general oceanography, productivity and biodiversity. According to recent habitat-based cetacean density models, the shelf break region is an area of high cetacean abundance and density, yet little research is directed at understanding the mechanisms that establish this region as a cetacean hotspot.

In Chapter Two I present the basic physical principles of sound in water and describe the methodology used to categorize opportunistically collected multi-frequency active acoustic data using frequency responses techniques. Frequency response classification methods are usually employed in conjunction with net-tow data, but the logistics of the 2011 AMAPPS survey did not allow for appropriate net-tow data to be collected. Biologically meaningful information can be extracted from acoustic scattering regions by comparing the frequency response curves of acoustic regions to theoretical curves of known scattering models. Using the five frequencies on the EK60 system (18, 38, 70, 120, and 200 kHz), three categories of scatterers were defined: fish-like (with swim bladder), nekton-like (e.g., euphausiids), and plankton-like (e.g., copepods). I also employed a multi-frequency acoustic categorization method using three frequencies (18, 38, and 120 kHz) that has been used in the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank which is based the presence or absence of volume backscatter above a threshold. This method is more objective than the comparison of frequency response curves because it uses an established backscatter value for the threshold. By removing all data below the threshold, only strong scattering information is retained.

In Chapter Three I analyze the distribution of the categorized acoustic regions of interest during the daytime cross shelf transects. Over all transects, plankton-like acoustic regions of interest were detected most frequently, followed by fish-like acoustic regions and then nekton-like acoustic regions. Plankton-like detections were the only significantly different acoustic detections per kilometer, although nekton-like detections were only slightly not significant. Using the threshold categorization method by Jech and Michaels (2006) provides a more conservative and discrete detection of acoustic scatterers and allows me to retrieve backscatter values along transects in areas that have been categorized. This provides continuous data values that can be integrated at discrete spatial increments for wavelet analysis. Wavelet analysis indicates significant spatial scales of interest for fish-like and nekton-like acoustic backscatter range from one to four kilometers and vary among transects.

In Chapter Four I analyze the fine scale distribution of cetaceans in the shelf break system of the Mid-Atlantic Bight using corrected sightings per trackline region, classification trees, multidimensional scaling, and random forest analysis. I describe habitat for common dolphins, Risso’s dolphins and sperm whales. From the distribution of cetacean sightings, patterns of habitat start to emerge: within the shelf break region of the Mid-Atlantic Bight, common dolphins were sighted more prevalently over the shelf while sperm whales were more frequently found in the deep waters offshore and Risso’s dolphins were most prevalent at the shelf break. Multidimensional scaling presents clear environmental separation among common dolphins and Risso’s dolphins and sperm whales. The sperm whale random forest habitat model had the lowest misclassification error (0.30) and the Risso’s dolphin random forest habitat model had the greatest misclassification error (0.37). Shallow water depth (less than 148 meters) was the primary variable selected in the classification model for common dolphin habitat. Distance to surface density fronts and surface temperature fronts were the primary variables selected in the classification models to describe Risso’s dolphin habitat and sperm whale habitat respectively. When mapped back into geographic space, these three cetacean species occupy different fine-scale habitats within the dynamic Mid-Atlantic Bight shelf break system.

In Chapter Five I present a summary of the previous chapters and present potential analytical steps to address ecological questions pertaining the dynamic shelf break region. Taken together, the results of my dissertation demonstrate the use of opportunistically collected data in ecosystem studies; emphasize the need to incorporate middle trophic level data and oceanographic features into cetacean habitat models; and emphasize the importance of developing more mechanistic understanding of dynamic ecosystems.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.