Trust and efficiency

Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We model trust as mutual, reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. We conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Electronic Techtonics: Thinking at the Interface

This volume originated in HASTAC’s first international conference, “Electronic Techtonics: Thinking at the Interface,” held at Duke University during April 19-21, 2007. “Electronic Techtonics” was the site of truly unforgettable conversations and encounters that traversed domains, disciplines, and media – conversations that explored the fluidity of technology both as interface as well as at the interface. This hardcopy version of the conference proceedings is published in conjunction with its electronic counterpart (found at www.hastac.org). Both versions exist as records of the range and depth of conversations that took place at the conference. Some of the papers in this volume are almost exact records of talks given at the conference, while others are versions that were revised and reworked some time after the conference. These papers are drawn from a variety of fields and we have not made an effort to homogenize them in any way, but have instead retained the individual format and style of each author.