Studying Recommender Systems to Enhance Distributed Computing Schedulers

Distributed Computing frameworks belong to a class of programming models that allow developers to

launch workloads on large clusters of machines. Due to the dramatic increase in the volume of

data gathered by ubiquitous computing devices, data analytic workloads have become a common

case among distributed computing applications, making Data Science an entire field of

Computer Science. We argue that Data Scientist's concern lays in three main components: a dataset,

a sequence of operations they wish to apply on this dataset, and some constraint they may have

related to their work (performances, QoS, budget, etc). However, it is actually extremely

difficult, without domain expertise, to perform data science. One need to select the right amount

and type of resources, pick up a framework, and configure it. Also, users are often running their

application in shared environments, ruled by schedulers expecting them to specify precisely their resource

needs. Inherent to the distributed and concurrent nature of the cited frameworks, monitoring and

profiling are hard, high dimensional problems that block users from making the right

configuration choices and determining the right amount of resources they need. Paradoxically, the

system is gathering a large amount of monitoring data at runtime, which remains unused.

In the ideal abstraction we envision for data scientists, the system is adaptive, able to exploit

monitoring data to learn about workloads, and process user requests into a tailored execution

context. In this work, we study different techniques that have been used to make steps toward

such system awareness, and explore a new way to do so by implementing machine learning

techniques to recommend a specific subset of system configurations for Apache Spark applications.

Furthermore, we present an in depth study of Apache Spark executors configuration, which highlight

the complexity in choosing the best one for a given workload.

SAFE: A Declarative Trust-Agile System with Linked Credentials

Secure Access For Everyone (SAFE), is an integrated system for managing trust

using a logic-based declarative language. Logical trust systems authorize each

request by constructing a proof from a context---a set of authenticated logic

statements representing credentials and policies issued by various principals

in a networked system. A key barrier to practical use of logical trust systems

is the problem of managing proof contexts: identifying, validating, and

assembling the credentials and policies that are relevant to each trust

decision.

SAFE addresses this challenge by (i) proposing a distributed authenticated data

repository for storing the credentials and policies; (ii) introducing a

programmable credential discovery and assembly layer that generates the

appropriate tailored context for a given request. The authenticated data

repository is built upon a scalable key-value store with its contents named by

secure identifiers and certified by the issuing principal. The SAFE language

provides scripting primitives to generate and organize logic sets representing

credentials and policies, materialize the logic sets as certificates, and link

them to reflect delegation patterns in the application. The authorizer fetches

the logic sets on demand, then validates and caches them locally for further

use. Upon each request, the authorizer constructs the tailored proof context

and provides it to the SAFE inference for certified validation.

Delegation-driven credential linking with certified data distribution provides

flexible and dynamic policy control enabling security and trust infrastructure

to be agile, while addressing the perennial problems related to today's

certificate infrastructure: automated credential discovery, scalable

revocation, and issuing credentials without relying on centralized authority.

We envision SAFE as a new foundation for building secure network systems. We

used SAFE to build secure services based on case studies drawn from practice:

(i) a secure name service resolver similar to DNS that resolves a name across

multi-domain federated systems; (ii) a secure proxy shim to delegate access

control decisions in a key-value store; (iii) an authorization module for a

networked infrastructure-as-a-service system with a federated trust structure

(NSF GENI initiative); and (iv) a secure cooperative data analytics service

that adheres to individual secrecy constraints while disclosing the data. We

present empirical evaluation based on these case studies and demonstrate that

SAFE supports a wide range of applications with low overhead.