Prospective Estimation of Radiation Dose and Image Quality for Optimized CT Performance

X-ray computed tomography (CT) is a non-invasive medical imaging technique that generates cross-sectional images by acquiring attenuation-based projection measurements at multiple angles. Since its first introduction in the 1970s, substantial technical improvements have led to the expanding use of CT in clinical examinations. CT has become an indispensable imaging modality for the diagnosis of a wide array of diseases in both pediatric and adult populations [1, 2]. Currently, approximately 272 million CT examinations are performed annually worldwide, with nearly 85 million of these in the United States alone [3]. Although this trend has decelerated in recent years, CT usage is still expected to increase mainly due to advanced technologies such as multi-energy [4], photon counting [5], and cone-beam CT [6].

Despite the significant clinical benefits, concerns have been raised regarding the population-based radiation dose associated with CT examinations [7]. From 1980 to 2006, the effective dose from medical diagnostic procedures rose six-fold, with CT contributing to almost half of the total dose from medical exposure [8]. For each patient, the risk associated with a single CT examination is likely to be minimal. However, the relatively large population-based radiation level has led to enormous efforts among the community to manage and optimize the CT dose.

As promoted by the international campaigns Image Gently and Image Wisely, exposure to CT radiation should be appropriate and safe [9, 10]. It is thus a responsibility to optimize the amount of radiation dose for CT examinations. The key for dose optimization is to determine the minimum amount of radiation dose that achieves the targeted image quality [11]. Based on such principle, dose optimization would significantly benefit from effective metrics to characterize radiation dose and image quality for a CT exam. Moreover, if accurate predictions of the radiation dose and image quality were possible before the initiation of the exam, it would be feasible to personalize it by adjusting the scanning parameters to achieve a desired level of image quality. The purpose of this thesis is to design and validate models to quantify patient-specific radiation dose prospectively and task-based image quality. The dual aim of the study is to implement the theoretical models into clinical practice by developing an organ-based dose monitoring system and an image-based noise addition software for protocol optimization.

More specifically, Chapter 3 aims to develop an organ dose-prediction method for CT examinations of the body under constant tube current condition. The study effectively modeled the anatomical diversity and complexity using a large number of patient models with representative age, size, and gender distribution. The dependence of organ dose coefficients on patient size and scanner models was further evaluated. Distinct from prior work, these studies use the largest number of patient models to date with representative age, weight percentile, and body mass index (BMI) range.

With effective quantification of organ dose under constant tube current condition, Chapter 4 aims to extend the organ dose prediction system to tube current modulated (TCM) CT examinations. The prediction, applied to chest and abdominopelvic exams, was achieved by combining a convolution-based estimation technique that quantifies the radiation field, a TCM scheme that emulates modulation profiles from major CT vendors, and a library of computational phantoms with representative sizes, ages, and genders. The prospective quantification model is validated by comparing the predicted organ dose with the dose estimated based on Monte Carlo simulations with TCM function explicitly modeled.

Chapter 5 aims to implement the organ dose-estimation framework in clinical practice to develop an organ dose-monitoring program based on a commercial software (Dose Watch, GE Healthcare, Waukesha, WI). In the first phase of the study we focused on body CT examinations, and so the patient’s major body landmark information was extracted from the patient scout image in order to match clinical patients against a computational phantom in the library. The organ dose coefficients were estimated based on CT protocol and patient size as reported in Chapter 3. The exam CTDIvol, DLP, and TCM profiles were extracted and used to quantify the radiation field using the convolution technique proposed in Chapter 4.

With effective methods to predict and monitor organ dose, Chapters 6 aims to develop and validate improved measurement techniques for image quality assessment. Chapter 6 outlines the method that was developed to assess and predict quantum noise in clinical body CT images. Compared with previous phantom-based studies, this study accurately assessed the quantum noise in clinical images and further validated the correspondence between phantom-based measurements and the expected clinical image quality as a function of patient size and scanner attributes.

Chapter 7 aims to develop a practical strategy to generate hybrid CT images and assess the impact of dose reduction on diagnostic confidence for the diagnosis of acute pancreatitis. The general strategy is (1) to simulate synthetic CT images at multiple reduced-dose levels from clinical datasets using an image-based noise addition technique; (2) to develop quantitative and observer-based methods to validate the realism of simulated low-dose images; (3) to perform multi-reader observer studies on the low-dose image series to assess the impact of dose reduction on the diagnostic confidence for multiple diagnostic tasks; and (4) to determine the dose operating point for clinical CT examinations based on the minimum diagnostic performance to achieve protocol optimization.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of accomplished work and a discussion about future research.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.