Altered ultrasonic vocalization and impaired learning and memory in Angelman syndrome mouse model with a large maternal deletion from Ube3a to Gabrb3.

Angelman syndrome (AS) is a neurobehavioral disorder associated with mental retardation, absence of language development, characteristic electroencephalography (EEG) abnormalities and epilepsy, happy disposition, movement or balance disorders, and autistic behaviors. The molecular defects underlying AS are heterogeneous, including large maternal deletions of chromosome 15q11-q13 (70%), paternal uniparental disomy (UPD) of chromosome 15 (5%), imprinting mutations (rare), and mutations in the E6-AP ubiquitin ligase gene UBE3A (15%). Although patients with UBE3A mutations have a wide spectrum of neurological phenotypes, their features are usually milder than AS patients with deletions of 15q11-q13. Using a chromosomal engineering strategy, we generated mutant mice with a 1.6-Mb chromosomal deletion from Ube3a to Gabrb3, which inactivated the Ube3a and Gabrb3 genes and deleted the Atp10a gene. Homozygous deletion mutant mice died in the perinatal period due to a cleft palate resulting from the null mutation in Gabrb3 gene. Mice with a maternal deletion (m-/p+) were viable and did not have any obvious developmental defects. Expression analysis of the maternal and paternal deletion mice confirmed that the Ube3a gene is maternally expressed in brain, and showed that the Atp10a and Gabrb3 genes are biallelically expressed in all brain sub-regions studied. Maternal (m-/p+), but not paternal (m+/p-), deletion mice had increased spontaneous seizure activity and abnormal EEG. Extensive behavioral analyses revealed significant impairment in motor function, learning and memory tasks, and anxiety-related measures assayed in the light-dark box in maternal deletion but not paternal deletion mice. Ultrasonic vocalization (USV) recording in newborns revealed that maternal deletion pups emitted significantly more USVs than wild-type littermates. The increased USV in maternal deletion mice suggests abnormal signaling behavior between mothers and pups that may reflect abnormal communication behaviors in human AS patients. Thus, mutant mice with a maternal deletion from Ube3a to Gabrb3 provide an AS mouse model that is molecularly more similar to the contiguous gene deletion form of AS in humans than mice with Ube3a mutation alone. These mice will be valuable for future comparative studies to mice with maternal deficiency of Ube3a alone.

Autobiographical memory for stressful events: the role of autobiographical memory in posttraumatic stress disorder.

To provide the three-way comparisons needed to test existing theories, we compared (1) most-stressful memories to other memories and (2) involuntary to voluntary memories (3) in 75 community dwelling adults with and 42 without a current diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Each rated their three most-stressful, three most-positive, seven most-important and 15 word-cued autobiographical memories, and completed tests of personality and mood. Involuntary memories were then recorded and rated as they occurred for 2 weeks. Standard mechanisms of cognition and affect applied to extreme events accounted for the properties of stressful memories. Involuntary memories had greater emotional intensity than voluntary memories, but were not more frequently related to traumatic events. The emotional intensity, rehearsal, and centrality to the life story of both voluntary and involuntary memories, rather than incoherence of voluntary traumatic memories and enhanced availability of involuntary traumatic memories, were the properties of autobiographical memories associated with PTSD.

Memory in posttraumatic stress disorder: properties of voluntary and involuntary, traumatic and nontraumatic autobiographical memories in people with and without posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms.

One hundred fifteen undergraduates rated 15 word-cued memories and their 3 most negatively stressful, 3 most positive, and 7 most important events and completed tests of personality and depression. Eighty-nine also recorded involuntary memories online for 1 week. In the first 3-way comparisons needed to test existing theories, comparisons were made of memories of stressful events versus control events and involuntary versus voluntary memories in people high versus low in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity. For all participants, stressful memories had more emotional intensity, more frequent voluntary and involuntary retrieval, but not more fragmentation. For all memories, participants with greater PTSD symptom severity showed the same differences. Involuntary memories had more emotional intensity and less centrality to the life story than voluntary memories. Meeting the diagnostic criteria for traumatic events had no effect, but the emotional responses to events did. In 533 undergraduates, correlations among measures were replicated and the Negative Intensity factor of the Affect Intensity Measure correlated with PTSD symptom severity. No special trauma mechanisms were needed to account for the results, which are summarized by the autobiographical memory theory of PTSD.

The Impact of Marijuana Use on Memory in Patients with HIV/AIDS

The most robust neurocognitive effect of marijuana use is memory impairment. Memory deficits are also high among persons living with HIV/AIDS, and marijuana use among this population is disproportionately common. Yet research examining neurocognitive outcomes resulting from co-occurring marijuana and HIV is virtually non-existent. The primary aim of this case-controlled study was to identify patterns of neurocognitive impairment among HIV patients who used marijuana compared to HIV patients who did not use drugs by comparing the groups on domain T-scores. Participants included 32 current marijuana users and 37 non-drug users. A comprehensive battery assessed substance use and neurocognitive functioning. Among the full sample, marijuana users performed significantly worse on verbal memory tasks compared to non-drug users and significantly better on attention/working memory tasks. A secondary aim of this study was to test whether the effect of marijuana use on memory was moderated by HIV disease progression, but these models were not significant. This study also examined whether the effect of marijuana use was differentially affected by marijuana use characteristics, finding that earlier age of initiation was associated with worse memory performance. These findings have important clinical implications, particularly given increased legalization of this drug to manage HIV infection.

Chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit divergent spatial memory development.

Spatial cognition and memory are critical cognitive skills underlying foraging behaviors for all primates. While the emergence of these skills has been the focus of much research on human children, little is known about ontogenetic patterns shaping spatial cognition in other species. Comparative developmental studies of nonhuman apes can illuminate which aspects of human spatial development are shared with other primates, versus which aspects are unique to our lineage. Here we present three studies examining spatial memory development in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (P. paniscus). We first compared memory in a naturalistic foraging task where apes had to recall the location of resources hidden in a large outdoor enclosure with a variety of landmarks (Studies 1 and 2). We then compared older apes using a matched memory choice paradigm (Study 3). We found that chimpanzees exhibited more accurate spatial memory than bonobos across contexts, supporting predictions from these species' different feeding ecologies. Furthermore, chimpanzees - but not bonobos - showed developmental improvements in spatial memory, indicating that bonobos exhibit cognitive paedomorphism (delays in developmental timing) in their spatial abilities relative to chimpanzees. Together, these results indicate that the development of spatial memory may differ even between closely related species. Moreover, changes in the spatial domain can emerge during nonhuman ape ontogeny, much like some changes seen in human children.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

Emotional intensity predicts autobiographical memory experience.

College students generated autobiographical memories from distinct emotional categories that varied in valence (positive vs. negative) and intensity (high vs. low). They then rated various perceptual, cognitive, and emotional properties for each memory. The distribution of these emotional memories favored a vector model over a circumplex model. For memories of all specific emotions, intensity accounted for significantly more variance in autobiographical memory characteristics than did valence or age of the memory. In two additional experiments, we examined multiple memories of emotions of high intensity and positive or negative valence and of positive valence and high or low intensity. Intensity was a more consistent predictor of autobiographical memory properties than was valence or the age of the memory in these experiments as well. The general effects of emotion on autobiographical memory properties are due primarily to intensity differences in emotional experience, not to benefits or detriments associated with a specific valence.

Stability in autobiographical memories.

A total of 30 undergraduates recalled the same 20 autobiographical memories at two sessions separated by 2 weeks. At each session they dated their memories and rated them on 18 properties commonly studied in autobiographical memory experiments. Individuals showed moderate stability in their ratings on the 18 scales (r approximately .5), with consistency of dating being much higher (r = .96). There was more stability in the individuals' average rating on each scale (r approximately .8), even when the averages were calculated on different memories in the different sessions. The results are consistent with a constructive view of autobiographical memory, in which stable individual differences in cognitive style are important.

Experimental manipulations of the phenomenology of memory.

We investigated the effects of visual input at encoding and retrieval on the phenomenology of memory. In Experiment 1, participants took part in events with and without wearing blindfolds, and later were shown a video of the events. Blindfolding, as well as later viewing of the video, both tended to decrease recollection. In Experiment 2, participants were played videos, with and without the visual component, of events involving other people. Events listened to without visual input were recalled with less recollection; later adding of the visual component increased recollection. In Experiment 3, participants were provided with progressively more information about events that they had experienced, either in the form of photographs that they had taken of the events or narrative descriptions of those photographs. In comparison with manipulations at encoding, the addition of more visual or narrative cues at recall had similar but smaller effects on recollection.

Autobiographical Memories for Very Negative Events: The Effects of Thinking about and Rating Memories.

In three related experiments, 250 participants rated properties of their autobiographical memory of a very negative event before and after writing about either their deepest thoughts and emotions of the event or a control topic. Levels of emotional intensity of the event, distress associated with the event, intrusive symptoms, and other phenomenological memory properties decreased over the course of the experiment, but did not differ by writing condition. We argue that the act of answering our extensive questions about a very negative event led to the decrease, thereby masking the effects of expressive writing. To show that the changes could not be explained by the mere passage of time, we replicated our findings in a fourth experiment in which all 208 participants nominated a very negative event, but only half the participants rated properties of their memory in the first session. Implications for reducing the effects of negative autobiographical memories are discussed.

Contrasting Models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Reply to Monroe and Mineka (2008)

The authors address the 4 main points in S. M. Monroe and S. Mineka's (2008) comment. First, the authors show that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis includes an etiology and that it is based on a theoretical model with a distinguished history in psychology and psychiatry. Two tenets of this theoretical model are that voluntary (strategic) recollections of the trauma are fragmented and incomplete while involuntary (spontaneous) recollections are vivid and persistent and yield privileged access to traumatic material. Second, the authors describe differences between their model and other cognitive models of PTSD. They argue that these other models share the same 2 tenets as the diagnosis and show that these 2 tenets are largely unsupported by empirical evidence. Third, the authors counter arguments about the strength of the evidence favoring the mnemonic model. Fourth, they show that concerns about the causal role of memory in PTSD are based on views of causality that are generally inappropriate for the explanation of PTSD in the social and biological sciences. © 2008 American Psychological Association.

Belief and recollection of autobiographical memories.

In three experiments, undergraduates rated autobiographical memories on scales derived from existing theories of memory. In multiple regression analyses, ratings of the degree to which subjects recollected (i.e., relived) their memories were predicted by visual imagery, auditory imagery, and emotions, whereas ratings of belief in the accuracy of their memories were predicted by knowledge of the setting. Recollection was predicted equally well in between- and within-subjects analyses, but belief consistently had smaller correlations and multiple regression predictions between subjects; individual differences in the cognitive scales that we measured could not account well for individual differences in belief. In contrast, measures of mood (Beck Depression Index) and dissociation (Dissociative Experience Scale) added predictive value for belief, but not for recollection. We also found that highly relived memories almost always had strong visual images and that remember/know judgments made on autobiographical memories were more closely related to belief than to recollection.