A Decentralized Iron Cage: Do Chinese Local Officials Comply with the Central Government?

This paper contributes to the literature in nancial aid and authoritarian institutions.

For a long time, scholars are debating whether nancial aid is able to facilitate

development and governance. Though abundant evidence is provided, the answer is

still inconclusive. On the other hand, scholars investigating China argue that the

leadership uses various institutions to ensure local ocials' compliance. In this paper,

we nd that the nancial aid does not bring a positive impact and the central

government in China does not have enough monitoring capacity to force local o-

cials to comply. We study a redevelopment program established by Chinese central

government after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. By adopting a geographic regression

discontinuity combining with a dierence-in-dierences design, we show that

the redevelopment program does not signicantly develop the disaster area. On the

contrary, the evidence implies that the economy in the disaster area is worse after

receiving the aid. The results imply that local ocials do not follow the central government's

regulations and misuse the aid money for other purposes. In the future, we

expect to further investigate through which mechanism do local ocials undermine

the existing institutions.

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Local government revenue from oil and gas production

Oil and gas production generates substantial revenue for state and local governments. This report examines revenue from oil and gas production flowing to local governments through four mechanisms: (i) state taxes or fees on oil and gas production; (ii) local property taxes on oil and gas property; (iii) leasing of state-owned land; and (iv) leasing of federally owned land. We examine every major oil- and gas-producing state and find that the share of oil and gas production value allocated to and collected by local governments ranges widely, from 0.5 percent to more than 9 percent due to numerous policy differences among states. School districts and trust funds endowing future school operations tend to see the highest share of revenue, followed by counties. Municipalities and other local governments with more limited geographic boundaries tend to receive smaller shares of oil and gas driven revenue. Some states utilize grant programs to allocate revenue to where impacts from the industry are greatest. Others send most revenue to state operating or trust funds, with little revenue earmarked specifically for local governments.

Colorado's Piceance Basin: Variation in the local public finance effects of oil and gas development

A large increase in natural gas production occurred in western Colorado’s Piceance basin in the mid- to late-2000s, generating a surge in population, economic activity, and heavy truck traffic in this rural region. We describe the fiscal effects related to this development for two county governments: Garfield and Rio Blanco, and two city governments: Grand Junction and Rifle. Counties maintain rural road networks in Colorado, and Garfield County’s ability to fashion agreements with operators to repair roads damaged during operations helped prevent the types of large new costs seen in Rio Blanco County, a neighboring county with less government capacity and where such agreements were not made. Rifle and Grand Junction experienced substantial oil- and gas-driven population growth, with greater challenges in the smaller, more isolated, and less economically diverse city of Rifle. Lessons from this case study include the value of crafting road maintenance agreements, fiscal risks for small and geographically isolated communities experiencing rapid population growth, challenges associated with limited infrastructure, and the desirability of flexibility in the allocation of oil- and gas-related revenue.

Local fiscal effects of oil and gas development in eight states

Oil and gas production in the United States has increased dramatically in the past 10 years. This growth has important implications for local governments, which often see new revenues from a variety of sources: property taxes on oil and gas property, sales taxes driven by the oil and gas workforce, allocations of state revenues from severance taxes or state and federal leases, leases on local government land, and contributions from oil and gas companies to support local services. At the same time, local governments tend to experience a range of new costs such as road damage caused by heavy industry truck traffic, increased demand for emergency services and law enforcement, and challenges with workforce retention. This report examines county and municipal fiscal effects in 14 oil- and gas-producing regions of eight states: AK, CA, KS, OH, OK, NM, UT, and WV. We find that for most local governments, oil and gas development—whether new or longstanding—has a positive effect on local public finances. However, effects can vary substantially due to a variety of local factors and policy issues. For some local governments, particularly those in rural regions experiencing large increases in development, revenues have not kept pace with rapidly increased costs and demand for services, particularly on road repair.