Local government revenue from oil and gas production

Oil and gas production generates substantial revenue for state and local governments. This report examines revenue from oil and gas production flowing to local governments through four mechanisms: (i) state taxes or fees on oil and gas production; (ii) local property taxes on oil and gas property; (iii) leasing of state-owned land; and (iv) leasing of federally owned land. We examine every major oil- and gas-producing state and find that the share of oil and gas production value allocated to and collected by local governments ranges widely, from 0.5 percent to more than 9 percent due to numerous policy differences among states. School districts and trust funds endowing future school operations tend to see the highest share of revenue, followed by counties. Municipalities and other local governments with more limited geographic boundaries tend to receive smaller shares of oil and gas driven revenue. Some states utilize grant programs to allocate revenue to where impacts from the industry are greatest. Others send most revenue to state operating or trust funds, with little revenue earmarked specifically for local governments.

Local fiscal effects of oil and gas development in eight states

Oil and gas production in the United States has increased dramatically in the past 10 years. This growth has important implications for local governments, which often see new revenues from a variety of sources: property taxes on oil and gas property, sales taxes driven by the oil and gas workforce, allocations of state revenues from severance taxes or state and federal leases, leases on local government land, and contributions from oil and gas companies to support local services. At the same time, local governments tend to experience a range of new costs such as road damage caused by heavy industry truck traffic, increased demand for emergency services and law enforcement, and challenges with workforce retention. This report examines county and municipal fiscal effects in 14 oil- and gas-producing regions of eight states: AK, CA, KS, OH, OK, NM, UT, and WV. We find that for most local governments, oil and gas development—whether new or longstanding—has a positive effect on local public finances. However, effects can vary substantially due to a variety of local factors and policy issues. For some local governments, particularly those in rural regions experiencing large increases in development, revenues have not kept pace with rapidly increased costs and demand for services, particularly on road repair.

Dunn County and Watford City, North Dakota: A case study of the fiscal effects of Bakken shale development

The Bakken region of North Dakota and Montana has experienced perhaps the greatest effects of increased oil and gas development in the United States, with major implications for local governments. Though development of the Bakken began in the early 2000s, large-scale drilling and population growth dramatically affected the region from roughly 2008 through today. This case study examines the local government fiscal benefits and challenges experienced by Dunn County and Watford City, which lie near the heart of the producing region. For both local governments, the initial growth phase presented major fiscal challenges due to rapidly expanding service demands and insufficient revenue. In the following years, these challenges eased as demand for services slowed due to declining industry activity and state tax policies redirected more funds to localities. Looking forward, both local governments describe their fiscal health as stronger because of the Bakken boom, though higher debt loads and an economy heavily dependent on the volatile oil and gas industry each pose challenges for future fiscal stability.

Multilevel Governance and Accountability: Does Decentralization Promote Good Governance?

Today, the trend towards decentralization is far-reaching. Proponents of decentralization have argued that decentralization promotes responsive and accountable local government by shortening the distance between local representatives and their constituency. However, in this paper, I focus on the countervailing effect of decentralization on the accountability mechanism, arguing that decentralization, which increases the number of actors eligible for policy making and implementation in governance as a whole, may blur lines of responsibility, thus weakening citizens’ ability to sanction government in election. By using the ordinary least squares (OLS) interaction model based on historical panel data for 78 countries in the 2002 – 2010 period, I test the hypothesis that as the number of government tiers increases, there will be a negative interaction between the number of government tiers and decentralization policies. The regression results show empirical evidence that decentralization policies, having a positive impact on governance under a relatively simple form of multilevel governance, have no more statistically significant effects as the complexity of government structure exceeds a certain degree. In particular, this paper found that the presence of intergovernmental meeting with legally binding authority have a negative impact on governance when the complexity of government structure reaches to the highest level.

Community Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in East Palo Alto

Climate change and sea level rise continue to devastate communities around the globe. The impacts have a disproportionate effect on those of lower socio-economic levels, and the consequences are frequently not borne equally amongst impacted individuals (UNDP, 2013). Community-based adaptation has been widely used to assess vulnerabilities and impacts at the community level, with an inclusive process that addresses root causes of risk. The process provides the opportunity for local government to empower and engaged impacted communities in identifying and prioritizing their urgent adaptation needs. This study aims to understand East Palo Alto community vulnerabilities by assessing local knowledge and perception of risk to climate change. East Palo Alto, an urban city in California with socio-economic challenges, is vulnerable to flooding and coastal inundation. The limited financial and institutional capacity of the local government and community increases vulnerability and risk. Recommendations and steps are presented to guide actions and programs that are crucial in addressing community priorities and concerns.

Community Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in East Palo Alto

Climate change and sea level rise continue to devastate communities around the globe. The impacts have a disproportionate effect on those of lower socio-economic levels, and the consequences are frequently not borne equally amongst impacted individuals (UNDP, 2013). Community-based adaptation has been widely used to assess vulnerabilities and impacts at the community level, with an inclusive process that addresses root causes of risk. The process provides the opportunity for local government to empower and engaged impacted communities in identifying and prioritising their urgent adaptation needs. This study aims to understand East Palo Alto community vulnerabilities by assessing local knowledge and perception of risk to climate change. East Palo Alto, an urban city in California with socio- economic challenges, is vulnerable to flooding and coastal inundation. The limited financial and institutional capacity of the local government and community increases vulnerability and risk. Recommendations and steps are presented to guide actions and programs that are crucial in addressing community priorities and concerns

A Decentralized Iron Cage: Do Chinese Local Officials Comply with the Central Government?

This paper contributes to the literature in nancial aid and authoritarian institutions.

For a long time, scholars are debating whether nancial aid is able to facilitate

development and governance. Though abundant evidence is provided, the answer is

still inconclusive. On the other hand, scholars investigating China argue that the

leadership uses various institutions to ensure local ocials' compliance. In this paper,

we nd that the nancial aid does not bring a positive impact and the central

government in China does not have enough monitoring capacity to force local o-

cials to comply. We study a redevelopment program established by Chinese central

government after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. By adopting a geographic regression

discontinuity combining with a dierence-in-dierences design, we show that

the redevelopment program does not signicantly develop the disaster area. On the

contrary, the evidence implies that the economy in the disaster area is worse after

receiving the aid. The results imply that local ocials do not follow the central government's

regulations and misuse the aid money for other purposes. In the future, we

expect to further investigate through which mechanism do local ocials undermine

the existing institutions.

iii