The Role of Social Cognition and Person Perception in Economic Social Decision-Making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make social inferences about another person in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes. However, until recently, much research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics has examined social decision-making while failing to take into account the importance of the social context and social cognitive processes that are engaged when viewing another person. Using social psychological theory to guide our hypotheses, four research studies investigate the role of social cognition and person perception in guiding economic decisions made in social contexts. The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that only specific types of social information engage brain regions implicated in social cognition and hinder learning in social contexts. Study 2 (Chapter 3) extends these findings and examines contexts in which this social information is used to generalize across contexts to form predictions about another person’s behavior. Study 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrates that under certain contexts these social cognitive processes may be withheld in order to more effectively complete the task at hand. Last, Study 4 (Chapter 5) examines how this knowledge of social cognitive processing can be used to change behavior in a prosocial group context. Taken together, these studies add to the growing body of literature examining decision-making in social contexts and highlight the importance of social cognitive processing in guiding these decisions. Although social cognitive processing typically facilitates social interactions, these processes may alter economic decision-making in social contexts.

Schema-driven construction of future autobiographical traumatic events: the future is much more troubling than the past.

Research on future episodic thought has produced compelling theories and results in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. In experiments aimed to integrate these with basic concepts and methods from autobiographical memory research, 76 undergraduates remembered past and imagined future positive and negative events that had or would have a major impact on them. Correlations of the online ratings of visual and auditory imagery, emotion, and other measures demonstrated that individuals used the same processes to the same extent to remember past and construct future events. These measures predicted the theoretically important metacognitive judgment of past reliving and future "preliving" in similar ways. On standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events, scores for future negative events were much higher than scores for past negative events. The scores for future negative events were in the range that would qualify for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); the test was replicated (n = 52) to check for order effects. Consistent with earlier work, future events had less sensory vividness. Thus, the imagined symptoms of future events were unlikely to be caused by sensory vividness. In a second experiment, to confirm this, 63 undergraduates produced numerous added details between 2 constructions of the same negative future events; deficits in rated vividness were removed with no increase in the standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events. Neuroticism predicted individuals' reactions to negative past events but did not predict imagined reactions to future events. This set of novel methods and findings is interpreted in the contexts of the literatures of episodic future thought, autobiographical memory, PTSD, and classic schema theory.

Considering the role of social dynamics and positional behavior in gestural communication research.

While the hominin fossil record cannot inform us on either the presence or extent of social and cognitive abilities that may have paved the way for the emergence of language, studying non-vocal communication among our closest living relatives, the African apes, may provide valuable information about how language originated. Although much has been learned from gestural signaling in non-human primates, we have not yet established how and why gestural repertoires vary across species, what factors influence this variation, and how knowledge of these differences can contribute to an understanding of gestural signaling's contribution to language evolution. In this paper, we review arguments surrounding the theory that language evolved from gestural signaling and suggest some important factors to consider when conducting comparative studies of gestural communication among African apes. Specifically, we propose that social dynamics and positional behavior are critical components that shape the frequency and nature of gestural signaling across species and we argue that an understanding of these factors could shed light on how gestural communication may have been the basis of human language. We outline predictions for the influence of these factors on the frequencies and types of gestures used across the African apes and highlight the importance of including these factors in future gestural communication research with primates.

How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology.

Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.

Social-Cognitive Determinants of Success in Online Communities for Weight Management

Background: Online communities may be an effective, convenient, and relatively inexpensive intervention platform for individuals seeking assistance with weight management. Recent research suggests that these communities may be as effective as in-person treatments for weight management; however, very little is known about the characteristics that predict weight loss amongst those using an online community. Methods: Within a social-cognitive framework, we sought to identify the psychosocial characteristics that are associated with successful weight management for users of MyFitnessPal, a popular online community for weight management. We recruited participants who were new to the online community and asked them to complete 2 surveys (one at baseline and one 3 months later) that assessed various psychosocial constructs as well as self-reported height and weight. Results: Participants in our sample reported losing, on average, 4.55 kg during the 3-month time period. We found that engaging in weight control behaviors (e.g., monitoring food intake, weighing oneself, etc.) fully mediated the relationship between several of our variables of interest (i.e., baseline self-efficacy and perceived social support within the community) and weight loss. We also found that participants who expected to lose more weight at baseline were significantly more likely to have lost more weight at follow-up. Conclusions: On average, participants in our study lost a clinically meaningful amount of weight. Predictors of weight loss within this community included perceived support within the community (mediated by weight control behaviors), baseline self-efficacy (mediated by weight control behaviors), and baseline outcome expectations. Results of this study can ultimately serve to inform the design of future eHealth interventions for weight management.

Decision-Making in the Primate Brain

Making decisions is fundamental to everything we do, yet it can be impaired in various disorders and conditions. While research into the neural basis of decision-making has flourished in recent years, many questions remain about how decisions are instantiated in the brain. Here we explored how primates make abstract decisions and decisions in social contexts, as well as one way to non-invasively modulate the brain circuits underlying decision-making. We used rhesus macaques as our model organism. First we probed numerical decision-making, a form of abstract decision-making. We demonstrated that monkeys are able to compare discrete ratios, choosing an array with a greater ratio of positive to negative stimuli, even when this array does not have a greater absolute number of positive stimuli. Monkeys’ performance in this task adhered to Weber’s law, indicating that monkeys—like humans—treat proportions as analog magnitudes. Next we showed that monkeys’ ordinal decisions are influenced by spatial associations; when trained to select the fourth stimulus from the bottom in a vertical array, they subsequently selected the fourth stimulus from the left—and not from the right—in a horizontal array. In other words, they begin enumerating from one side of space and not the other, mirroring the human tendency to associate numbers with space. These and other studies confirmed that monkeys’ numerical decision-making follows similar patterns to that of humans, making them a good model for investigations of the neurobiological basis of numerical decision-making.

We sought to develop a system for exploring the neuronal basis of the cognitive and behavioral effects observed following transcranial magnetic stimulation, a relatively new, non-invasive method of brain stimulation that may be used to treat clinical disorders. We completed a set of pilot studies applying offline low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation to the macaque posterior parietal cortex, which has been implicated in numerical processing, while subjects performed a numerical comparison and control color comparison task, and while electrophysiological activity was recorded from the stimulated region of cortex. We found tentative evidence in one paradigm that stimulation did selectively impair performance in the number task, causally implicating the posterior parietal cortex in numerical decisions. In another paradigm, however, we manipulated the subject’s reaching behavior but not her number or color comparison performance. We also found that stimulation produced variable changes in neuronal firing and local field potentials. Together these findings lay the groundwork for detailed investigations into how different parameters of transcranial magnetic stimulation can interact with cortical architecture to produce various cognitive and behavioral changes.

Finally, we explored how monkeys decide how to behave in competitive social interactions. In a zero-sum computer game in which two monkeys played as a shooter or a goalie during a hockey-like “penalty shot” scenario, we found that shooters developed complex movement trajectories so as to conceal their intentions from the goalies. Additionally, we found that neurons in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex played a role in generating this “deceptive” behavior. We conclude that these regions of prefrontal cortex form part of a circuit that guides decisions to make an individual less predictable to an opponent.

Social Decision-Making in Bonobos and Chimpanzees

Humans are natural politicians. We obsessively collect social information that is both observable (e.g., about third-party relationships) and unobservable (e.g., about others’ psychological states), and we strategically employ that information to manage our cooperative and competitive relationships. To what extent are these abilities unique to our species, and how did they evolve? The present dissertation seeks to contribute to these two questions. To do so, I take a comparative perspective, investigating social decision-making in humans’ closest living relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees. In Chapter 1, I review existing literature on theory of mind—or the ability to understand others’ psychological states—in these species. I also present a theoretical framework to guide further investigation of social cognition in bonobos and chimpanzees based on hypotheses about the proximate and ultimate origins of their species differences. In Chapter 2, I experimentally investigate differences in the prosocial behavior of bonobos and chimpanzees, revealing species-specific prosocial motivations that appear to be less flexible than those exhibited by humans. In Chapter 3, I explore through decision-making experiments bonobos’ ability to evaluate others based on their prosocial or antisocial behavior during third-party interactions. Bonobos do track the interactions of third-parties and evaluate actors based on these interactions. However, they do not exhibit the human preference for those who are prosocial towards others, instead consistently favoring an antisocial individual. The motivation to prefer those who demonstrate a prosocial disposition may be a unique feature of human psychology that contributes to our ultra-cooperative nature. In Chapter 4, I investigate the adaptive value of social cognition in wild primates. I show that the recruitment behavior of wild chimpanzees at Gombe National Park, Tanzania is consistent with the use of third-party knowledge, and that those who appear to use third-party knowledge receive immediate proximate benefits. They escape further aggression from their opponents. These findings directly support the social intelligence hypothesis that social cognition has evolved in response to the demands of competing with one’s own group-mates. Thus, the studies presented here help to better characterize the features of social decision-making that are unique to humans, and how these abilities evolved.