Schema-driven construction of future autobiographical traumatic events: the future is much more troubling than the past.

Research on future episodic thought has produced compelling theories and results in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. In experiments aimed to integrate these with basic concepts and methods from autobiographical memory research, 76 undergraduates remembered past and imagined future positive and negative events that had or would have a major impact on them. Correlations of the online ratings of visual and auditory imagery, emotion, and other measures demonstrated that individuals used the same processes to the same extent to remember past and construct future events. These measures predicted the theoretically important metacognitive judgment of past reliving and future "preliving" in similar ways. On standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events, scores for future negative events were much higher than scores for past negative events. The scores for future negative events were in the range that would qualify for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); the test was replicated (n = 52) to check for order effects. Consistent with earlier work, future events had less sensory vividness. Thus, the imagined symptoms of future events were unlikely to be caused by sensory vividness. In a second experiment, to confirm this, 63 undergraduates produced numerous added details between 2 constructions of the same negative future events; deficits in rated vividness were removed with no increase in the standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events. Neuroticism predicted individuals' reactions to negative past events but did not predict imagined reactions to future events. This set of novel methods and findings is interpreted in the contexts of the literatures of episodic future thought, autobiographical memory, PTSD, and classic schema theory.

The Role of Social Cognition and Person Perception in Economic Social Decision-Making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make social inferences about another person in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes. However, until recently, much research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics has examined social decision-making while failing to take into account the importance of the social context and social cognitive processes that are engaged when viewing another person. Using social psychological theory to guide our hypotheses, four research studies investigate the role of social cognition and person perception in guiding economic decisions made in social contexts. The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that only specific types of social information engage brain regions implicated in social cognition and hinder learning in social contexts. Study 2 (Chapter 3) extends these findings and examines contexts in which this social information is used to generalize across contexts to form predictions about another person’s behavior. Study 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrates that under certain contexts these social cognitive processes may be withheld in order to more effectively complete the task at hand. Last, Study 4 (Chapter 5) examines how this knowledge of social cognitive processing can be used to change behavior in a prosocial group context. Taken together, these studies add to the growing body of literature examining decision-making in social contexts and highlight the importance of social cognitive processing in guiding these decisions. Although social cognitive processing typically facilitates social interactions, these processes may alter economic decision-making in social contexts.

How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology.

Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.

Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics

Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning, and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers, who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson's experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally, I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular moral concepts conclusion. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Quality of Life and Neurocognitive Functioning in Children with Sickle Cell Disease: Investigating the Feasibility of a Computerized Cognitive Training Program

Children with sickle cell disease (SCD) have a high risk of neurocognitive impairment. No known research, however, has examined the impact of neurocognitive functioning on quality of life in this pediatric population. In addition, limited research has examined neurocognitive interventions for these children. In light of these gaps, two studies were undertaken to (a) examine the relationship between cognitive functioning and quality of life in a sample of children with SCD and (b) investigate the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of a computerized working memory training program in this population. Forty-five youth (ages 8-16) with SCD and a caregiver were recruited for the first study. Participants completed measures of cognitive ability, quality of life, and psychosocial functioning. Results indicated that cognitive ability significantly predicted child- and parent-reported quality of life among youth with SCD. In turn, a randomized-controlled trial of a computerized working memory program was undertaken. Eighteen youth with SCD and a caregiver enrolled in this study, and were randomized to a waitlist control or the working memory training condition. Data pertaining to cognitive functioning, psychosocial functioning, and disease characteristics were obtained from participants. The results of this study indicated a high degree of acceptance for this intervention but poor feasibility in practice. Factors related to feasibility were identified. Implications and future directions are discussed.

When Working Memory and Attention Compete: Characterizing the Dynamic Interdependence between our Mental Workspace and External Environment

All of us are taxed with juggling our inner mental lives with immediate external task demands. For many years, the temporary maintenance of internal information was considered to be handled by a dedicated working memory (WM) system. It has recently become increasingly clear, however, that such short-term internal activation interacts with attention focused on external stimuli. It is unclear, however, exactly why these two interact, at what level of processing, and to what degree. Because our internal maintenance and external attention processes co-occur with one another, the manner of their interaction has vast implications for functioning in daily life. The work described here has employed original experimental paradigms combining WM and attention task elements, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to illuminate the associated neural processes, and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to clarify the causal substrates of attentional brain function. These studies have examined a mechanism that might explain why (and when) the content of WM can involuntarily capture visual attention. They have, furthermore, tested whether fundamental attentional selection processes operate within WM, and whether they are reciprocal with attention. Finally, they have illuminated the neural consequences of competing attentional demands. The findings indicate that WM shares representations, operating principles, and cognitive resources with externally-oriented attention.

Mapping the semantic structure of cognitive neuroscience.

Cognitive neuroscience, as a discipline, links the biological systems studied by neuroscience to the processing constructs studied by psychology. By mapping these relations throughout the literature of cognitive neuroscience, we visualize the semantic structure of the discipline and point to directions for future research that will advance its integrative goal. For this purpose, network text analyses were applied to an exhaustive corpus of abstracts collected from five major journals over a 30-month period, including every study that used fMRI to investigate psychological processes. From this, we generate network maps that illustrate the relationships among psychological and anatomical terms, along with centrality statistics that guide inferences about network structure. Three terms--prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and anterior cingulate cortex--dominate the network structure with their high frequency in the literature and the density of their connections with other neuroanatomical terms. From network statistics, we identify terms that are understudied compared with their importance in the network (e.g., insula and thalamus), are underspecified in the language of the discipline (e.g., terms associated with executive function), or are imperfectly integrated with other concepts (e.g., subdisciplines like decision neuroscience that are disconnected from the main network). Taking these results as the basis for prescriptive recommendations, we conclude that semantic analyses provide useful guidance for cognitive neuroscience as a discipline, both by illustrating systematic biases in the conduct and presentation of research and by identifying directions that may be most productive for future research.