Hannah Arendt's Theory of Political Judgment

Hannah Arendt's theory of political judgment has been an ongoing perplexity among scholars who have written on her. As a result, her theory of judgment is often treated as a suggestive but unfinished aspect of her thought. Drawing on a wider array of sources than is commonly utilized, I argue that her theory of political judgment was in fact the heart of her work. Arendt's project, in other words, centered around reestablishing the possibility of political judgment in a modern world that historically has progressively undermined it. In the dissertation, I systematically develop an account of Arendt's fundamentally political and non-sovereign notion of judgment. We discover that individual judgment is not arbitrary, and that even in the complex circumstances of the modern world there are valid structures of judgment which can be developed and dependably relied upon. The result of this work articulates a theory of practical reason which is highly compelling: it provides orientation for human agency which does not rob it of its free and spontaneous character; shows how we can improve and cultivate our political judgment; and points the way toward the profoundly intersubjective form of political philosophy Arendt ultimately hoped to develop.

Clinician judgment vs formal scales for predicting intracerebral hemorrhage outcomes.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the performance of formal prognostic instruments vs subjective clinical judgment with regards to predicting functional outcome in patients with spontaneous intracerebral hemorrhage (ICH). METHODS: This prospective observational study enrolled 121 ICH patients hospitalized at 5 US tertiary care centers. Within 24 hours of each patient's admission to the hospital, one physician and one nurse on each patient's clinical team were each asked to predict the patient's modified Rankin Scale (mRS) score at 3 months and to indicate whether he or she would recommend comfort measures. The admission ICH score and FUNC score, 2 prognostic scales selected for their common use in neurologic practice, were calculated for each patient. Spearman rank correlation coefficients (r) with respect to patients' actual 3-month mRS for the physician and nursing predictions were compared against the same correlation coefficients for the ICH score and FUNC score. RESULTS: The absolute value of the correlation coefficient for physician predictions with respect to actual outcome (0.75) was higher than that of either the ICH score (0.62, p = 0.057) or the FUNC score (0.56, p = 0.01). The nursing predictions of outcome (r = 0.72) also trended towards an accuracy advantage over the ICH score (p = 0.09) and FUNC score (p = 0.03). In an analysis that excluded patients for whom comfort care was recommended, the 65 available attending physician predictions retained greater accuracy (r = 0.73) than either the ICH score (r = 0.50, p = 0.02) or the FUNC score (r = 0.42, p = 0.004). CONCLUSIONS: Early subjective clinical judgment of physicians correlates more closely with 3-month outcome after ICH than prognostic scales.

How actions create--not just reveal--preferences.

The neo-classical economics view that behavior is driven by - and reflective of - hedonic utility is challenged by psychologists' demonstrations of cases in which actions do not merely reveal preferences but rather create them. In this view, preferences are frequently constructed in the moment and are susceptible to fleeting situational factors; problematically, individuals are insensitive to the impact of such factors on their behavior, misattributing utility caused by these irrelevant factors to stable underlying preferences. Consequently, subsequent behavior might reflect not hedonic utility but rather this erroneously imputed utility that lingers in memory. Here we review the roles of these streams of utility in shaping preferences, and discuss how neuroimaging offers unique possibilities for disentangling their independent contributions to behavior.

Real-Time Decision Making and Aggressive Behavior in Youth: A Heuristic Model of Response Evaluation and Decision (RED).

Considerable scientific and intervention attention has been paid to judgment and decision-making systems associated with aggressive behavior in youth. However, most empirical studies have investigated social-cognitive correlates of stable child and adolescent aggressiveness, and less is known about real-time decision making to engage in aggressive behavior. A model of real-time decision making must incorporate both impulsive actions and rational thought. The present paper advances a process model (response evaluation and decision; RED) of real-time behavioral judgments and decision making in aggressive youths with mathematic representations that may be used to quantify response strength. These components are a heuristic to describe decision making, though it is doubtful that individuals always mentally complete these steps. RED represents an organization of social-cognitive operations believed to be active during the response decision step of social information processing. The model posits that RED processes can be circumvented through impulsive responding. This article provides a description and integration of thoughtful, rational decision making and nonrational impulsivity in aggressive behavioral interactions.

Gauging possibilities for action based on friction underfoot.

Standing and walking generate information about friction underfoot. Five experiments examined whether walkers use such perceptual information for prospective control of locomotion. In particular, do walkers integrate information about friction underfoot with visual cues for sloping ground ahead to make adaptive locomotor decisions? Participants stood on low-, medium-, and high-friction surfaces on a flat platform and made perceptual judgments for possibilities for locomotion over upcoming slopes. Perceptual judgments did not match locomotor abilities: Participants tended to overestimate their abilities on low-friction slopes and underestimate on high-friction slopes (Experiments 1-4). Accuracy improved only for judgments made while participants were in direct contact with the slope (Experiment 5), highlighting the difficulty of incorporating information about friction underfoot into a plan for future actions.

Why walkers slip: shine is not a reliable cue for slippery ground.

In a series of four studies, we investigated the visual cues that walkers use to predict slippery ground surfaces and tested whether visual information is reliable for specifying low-friction conditions. In Study 1, 91% of participants surveyed responded that they would use shine to identify upcoming slippery ground. Studies 2-4 confirmed participants' reliance on shine to predict slip. Participants viewed ground surfaces varying in gloss, paint color, and viewing distance under indoor and outdoor lighting conditions. Shine and slip ratings and functional walking judgments were related to surface gloss level and to surface coefficient of friction (COF). However, judgments were strongly affected by surface color, viewing distance, and lighting conditions--extraneous factors that do not change the surface COF. Results suggest that, although walkers rely on shine to predict slippery ground, shine is not a reliable visual cue for friction. Poor visual information for friction may underlie the high prevalence of friction-related slips and falls.

Schema-driven construction of future autobiographical traumatic events: the future is much more troubling than the past.

Research on future episodic thought has produced compelling theories and results in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. In experiments aimed to integrate these with basic concepts and methods from autobiographical memory research, 76 undergraduates remembered past and imagined future positive and negative events that had or would have a major impact on them. Correlations of the online ratings of visual and auditory imagery, emotion, and other measures demonstrated that individuals used the same processes to the same extent to remember past and construct future events. These measures predicted the theoretically important metacognitive judgment of past reliving and future "preliving" in similar ways. On standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events, scores for future negative events were much higher than scores for past negative events. The scores for future negative events were in the range that would qualify for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); the test was replicated (n = 52) to check for order effects. Consistent with earlier work, future events had less sensory vividness. Thus, the imagined symptoms of future events were unlikely to be caused by sensory vividness. In a second experiment, to confirm this, 63 undergraduates produced numerous added details between 2 constructions of the same negative future events; deficits in rated vividness were removed with no increase in the standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events. Neuroticism predicted individuals' reactions to negative past events but did not predict imagined reactions to future events. This set of novel methods and findings is interpreted in the contexts of the literatures of episodic future thought, autobiographical memory, PTSD, and classic schema theory.

The reminiscence bump in the temporal distribution of the best football players of all time: Pelé, Cruijff or Maradona?

The reminiscence bump is the tendency to recall more autobiographical memories from adolescence and early adulthood than from adjacent lifetime periods. In this online study, the robustness of the reminiscence bump was examined by looking at participants' judgements about the quality of football players. Dutch participants (N = 619) were asked who they thought the five best players of all time were. The participants could select the names from a list or enter the names when their favourite players were not on the list. Johan Cruijff, Pelé, and Diego Maradona were the three most often mentioned players. Participants frequently named football players who reached the midpoint of their career when the participants were adolescents (mode = 17). The results indicate that the reminiscence bump can also be identified outside the autobiographical memory domain.

The temporal distribution of autobiographical memory: changes in reliving and vividness over the life span do not explain the reminiscence bump.

When autobiographical memories are elicited with word cues, personal events from middle childhood to early adulthood are overrepresented compared to events from other periods. It is, however, unclear whether these memories are also associated with greater recollection. In this online study, we examined whether autobiographical memories from adolescence and early adulthood are recollected more than memories from other lifetime periods. Participants rated personal events that were elicited with cue words on reliving or vividness. Consistent with previous studies, most memories came from the period in which the participants were between 6 and 20 years old. The memories from this period were not relived more or recalled more vividly than memories from other lifetime periods, suggesting that they do not involve more recollection. Recent events had higher levels of reliving and vividness than remote events, and older adults reported a stronger recollective experience than younger adults.

Component Neural Systems for the Creation of Emotional Memories during Free Viewing of a Complex, Real-World Event.

To investigate the neural systems that contribute to the formation of complex, self-relevant emotional memories, dedicated fans of rival college basketball teams watched a competitive game while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). During a subsequent recognition memory task, participants were shown video clips depicting plays of the game, stemming either from previously-viewed game segments (targets) or from non-viewed portions of the same game (foils). After an old-new judgment, participants provided emotional valence and intensity ratings of the clips. A data driven approach was first used to decompose the fMRI signal acquired during free viewing of the game into spatially independent components. Correlations were then calculated between the identified components and post-scanning emotion ratings for successfully encoded targets. Two components were correlated with intensity ratings, including temporal lobe regions implicated in memory and emotional functions, such as the hippocampus and amygdala, as well as a midline fronto-cingulo-parietal network implicated in social cognition and self-relevant processing. These data were supported by a general linear model analysis, which revealed additional valence effects in fronto-striatal-insular regions when plays were divided into positive and negative events according to the fan's perspective. Overall, these findings contribute to our understanding of how emotional factors impact distributed neural systems to successfully encode dynamic, personally-relevant event sequences.

The frequency of voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories across the life span.

In the present study, ratings of the memory of an important event from the previous week on the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval, belief in its accuracy, visual imagery, auditory imagery, setting, emotional intensity, valence, narrative coherence, and centrality to the life story were obtained from 988 adults whose ages ranged from 15 to over 90. Another 992 adults provided the same ratings for a memory from their confirmation day, when they were at about age 14. The frequencies of involuntary and voluntary retrieval were similar. Both frequencies were predicted by emotional intensity and centrality to the life story. The results from the present study-which is the first to measure the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval for the same events-are counter to both cognitive and clinical theories, which consistently claim that involuntary memories are infrequent as compared with voluntary memories. Age and gender differences are noted.

People over forty feel 20% younger than their age: subjective age across the lifespan.

Subjective age--the age people think of themselves asbeing--is measured in a representative Danish sample of 1,470 adults between 20 and 97 years of age through personal, in-home interviews. On the average, adults younger than 25 have older subjective ages, and those older than 25 have younger subjective ages, favoring a lifespan-developmental view over an age-denial view of subjective age. When the discrepancy between subjective and chronological age is calculated as a proportion of chronological age, no increase is seen after age 40; older respondents feel 20% younger than their actual age. Demographic variables (gender, income, and education) account for very little variance in subjective age.

Telescoping is not time compression: a model of the dating of autobiographical events.

A model of telescoping is proposed that assumes no systematic errors in dating. Rather, the overestimation of recent occurrences of events is based on the combination of three factors: (1) Retention is greater for recent events; (2) errors in dating, though unbiased, increase linearly with the time since the dated event; and (3) intrusions often occur from events outside the period being asked about, but such intrusions do not come from events that have not yet occurred. In Experiment 1, we found that recall for colloquia fell markedly over a 2-year interval, the magnitude of errors in psychologists' dating of the colloquia increased at a rate of .4 days per day of delay, and the direction of the dating error was toward the middle of the interval. In Experiment 2, the model used the retention function and dating errors from the first study to predict the distribution of the actual dates of colloquia recalled as being within a 5-month period. In Experiment 3, the findings of the first study were replicated with colloquia given by, instead of for, the subjects.

The Toronto Word Pool: Norms for imagery, concreteness, orthographic variables, and grammatical usage for 1,080 words

Imagery and concreteness norms and percentage noun usage were obtained on the 1,080 verbal items from the Toronto Word Pool. Imagery was defined as the rated ease with which a word aroused a mental image, and concreteness was defined in relation to level of abstraction. The degree to which a word was functionally a noun was estimated in a sentence generation task. The mean and standard deviation of the imagery and concreteness ratings for each item are reported together with letter and printed frequency counts for the words and indications of sex differences in the ratings. Additional data in the norms include a grammatical function code derived from dictionary definitions, a percent noun judgment, indexes of statistical approximation to English, and an orthographic neighbor ratio. Validity estimates for the imagery and concreteness ratings are derived from comparisons with scale values drawn from the Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) noun pool and the Toglia and Battig (1978) norms. © 1982 Psychonomic Society, Inc.

Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality.

Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.