Buffer stocks are better stabilizers than quotas

Michael Pelcovits (1979, p. 307) recently showed that with an unstable foreign excess supply curve, either a fixed quota or a buffer stock program with a fixed tariff can be used to stabilize domestic price at a given level, and both policies 'will have the same effect on social welfare [so...t]he choice between [the two...] must then be made on the basis of administrative cost and feasibility'. However, he reached his conclusion by ranking the two policies on the basis of domestic welfare, and in this note we demonstrate with his same model that on the basis of foreign welfare the buffer stock is better than the quota. Thus, world welfre is higher under the buffer stock than under the quota. © 1981.

Bid-ask spreads and volatility in the foreign exchange market. An empirical analysis

Consistent with the implications from a simple asymmetric information model for the bid-ask spread, we present empirical evidence that the size of the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange market is positively related to the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. The estimation results are based on an ordered probit analysis that captures the discreteness in the spread distribution, with the uncertainty of the spot exchange rate being quantified through a GARCH type model. The data sets consists of more than 300,000 continuously recorded Deutschemark/dollar quotes over the period from April 1989 to June 1989. © 1994.

On the functional relationship between tariffs and welfare

This paper uses a model of trade in two commodities between two countries to establish the following proposition. If the foreign offer curve has no points of inflection and if for each home rate of duty the equilibrium most favorable to the home country is selected (or else there is only one equilibrium), then as the rate of duty increases from zero, home welfare first rises then declines while foreign welfare steadily falls. © 1975.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.

Economics of new oncology drug development.

PURPOSE: Review existing studies and provide new results on the development, regulatory, and market aspects of new oncology drug development. METHODS: We utilized data from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), company surveys, and publicly available commercial business intelligence databases on new oncology drugs approved in the United States and on investigational oncology drugs to estimate average development and regulatory approval times, clinical approval success rates, first-in-class status, and global market diffusion. RESULTS: We found that approved new oncology drugs to have a disproportionately high share of FDA priority review ratings, of orphan drug designations at approval, and of drugs that were granted inclusion in at least one of the FDA's expedited access programs. US regulatory approval times were shorter, on average, for oncology drugs (0.5 years), but US clinical development times were longer on average (1.5 years). Clinical approval success rates were similar for oncology and other drugs, but proportionately more of the oncology failures reached expensive late-stage clinical testing before being abandoned. In relation to other drugs, new oncology drug approvals were more often first-in-class and diffused more widely across important international markets. CONCLUSION: The market success of oncology drugs has induced a substantial amount of investment in oncology drug development in the last decade or so. However, given the great need for further progress, the extent to which efforts to develop new oncology drugs will grow depends on future public-sector investment in basic research, developments in translational medicine, and regulatory reforms that advance drug-development science.