Geographic Information Systems-Based Approaches to Study Congressional Redistricting in the United States

The ability for the citizens of a nation to determine their own representation has long been regarded as one of the most critical objectives of any electoral system. Without having the assurance of equality in representation, the fundamental nature and operation of the political system is severely undermined. Given the centuries of institutional reforms and population changes in the American system, Congressional Redistricting stands as an institution whereby this promise of effective representation can either be fulfilled or denied. The broad set of processes that encapsulate Congres- sional Redistricting have been discussed, experimented, and modified to achieve clear objectives and have long been understood to be important. Questions remain about how the dynamics which link all of these processes operate and what impact the real- ities of Congressional Redistricting hold for representation in the American system. This dissertation examines three aspects of how Congressional Redistricting in the Untied States operates in accordance with the principle of “One Person, One Vote.” By utilizing data and data analysis techniques of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), this dissertation seeks to address how Congressional Redistricting impacts the principle of one person, one vote from the standpoint of legislator accountability, redistricting institutions, and the promise of effective minority representation.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.