Local government revenue from oil and gas production

Oil and gas production generates substantial revenue for state and local governments. This report examines revenue from oil and gas production flowing to local governments through four mechanisms: (i) state taxes or fees on oil and gas production; (ii) local property taxes on oil and gas property; (iii) leasing of state-owned land; and (iv) leasing of federally owned land. We examine every major oil- and gas-producing state and find that the share of oil and gas production value allocated to and collected by local governments ranges widely, from 0.5 percent to more than 9 percent due to numerous policy differences among states. School districts and trust funds endowing future school operations tend to see the highest share of revenue, followed by counties. Municipalities and other local governments with more limited geographic boundaries tend to receive smaller shares of oil and gas driven revenue. Some states utilize grant programs to allocate revenue to where impacts from the industry are greatest. Others send most revenue to state operating or trust funds, with little revenue earmarked specifically for local governments.

An examination of the effects of government purchases in an open economy

This paper examines the effects of permanent and transitory changes in government purchases in the context of a model of a small open economy that produces and consumes both traded and nontraded goods. The model incorporates an equilibrium interpretation of the business cycle that emphasizes the responsiveness of agents to intertemporal relative price changes. It is demonstrated that transitory increases in government purchases lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an ambiguous change (although a likely worsening) in the current account, while permanent increases have an ambiguous impact on the real exchange rate and no effect on the current account. When agents do not know whether a given increase in government purchases is permanent or transitory the effect is a weighted average of these separate effects. The weights depend on the relative variances of the transitory and permanent components of government purchases. © 1985.

The Emergence of Access Controls in Small-Scale Fishing Commons: A Comparative Analysis of Individual Licenses and Common Property-Rights in Two Mexican Communities

Addressing global fisheries overexploitation requires better understanding of how small-scale fishing communities in developing countries limit access to fishing grounds. We analyze the performance of a system based on individual licenses and a common property-rights regime in their ability to generate incentives for self-governance and conservation of fishery resources. Using a qualitative before-after-control-impact approach, we compare two neighbouring fishing communities in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Both were initially governed by the same permit system, are situated in the same ecosystem, use similar harvesting technology, and have overharvested similar species. One community changed to a common property-right regime, enabling the emergence of access controls and avoiding overexploitation of benthic resources, while the other community, still relies on the permit system. We discuss the roles played by power, institutions, socio-historic, and biophysical factors to develop access controls. © 2012 The Author(s).

Illicit cigarette consumption and government revenue loss in Indonesia.

BACKGROUND: Illicit cigarettes comprise more than 11% of tobacco consumption and 17% of consumption in low- and middle-income countries. Illicit cigarettes, defined as those that evade taxes, lower consumer prices, threaten national tobacco control efforts, and reduce excise tax collection. METHODS: This paper measures the magnitude of illicit cigarette consumption within Indonesia using two methods: the discrepancies between legal cigarette sales and domestic consumption estimated from surveys, and discrepancies between imports recorded by Indonesia and exports recorded by trade partners. Smuggling plays a minor role in the availability of illicit cigarettes because Indonesians predominantly consume kreteks, which are primarily manufactured in Indonesia. RESULTS: Looking at the period from 1995 to 2013, illicit cigarettes first emerged in 2004. When no respondent under-reporting is assumed, illicit consumption makes up 17% of the domestic market in 2004, 9% in 2007, 11% in 2011, and 8% in 2013. Discrepancies in the trade data indicate that Indonesia was a recipient of smuggled cigarettes for each year between 1995 and 2012. The value of this illicit trade ranges from less than $1 million to nearly $50 million annually. Singapore, China, and Vietnam together accounted for nearly two-thirds of trade discrepancies over the period. Tax losses due to illicit consumption amount to between Rp 4.1 and 9.3 trillion rupiah, 4% to 13% of tobacco excise revenue, in 2011 and 2013. CONCLUSIONS: Due to the predominance of kretek consumption in Indonesia and Indonesia's status as the predominant producer of kreteks, illicit domestic production is likely the most important source for illicit cigarettes, and initiatives targeted to combat this illicit production carry the promise of the greatest potential impact.