Colorado's Piceance Basin: Variation in the local public finance effects of oil and gas development

A large increase in natural gas production occurred in western Colorado’s Piceance basin in the mid- to late-2000s, generating a surge in population, economic activity, and heavy truck traffic in this rural region. We describe the fiscal effects related to this development for two county governments: Garfield and Rio Blanco, and two city governments: Grand Junction and Rifle. Counties maintain rural road networks in Colorado, and Garfield County’s ability to fashion agreements with operators to repair roads damaged during operations helped prevent the types of large new costs seen in Rio Blanco County, a neighboring county with less government capacity and where such agreements were not made. Rifle and Grand Junction experienced substantial oil- and gas-driven population growth, with greater challenges in the smaller, more isolated, and less economically diverse city of Rifle. Lessons from this case study include the value of crafting road maintenance agreements, fiscal risks for small and geographically isolated communities experiencing rapid population growth, challenges associated with limited infrastructure, and the desirability of flexibility in the allocation of oil- and gas-related revenue.

A Decentralized Iron Cage: Do Chinese Local Officials Comply with the Central Government?

This paper contributes to the literature in nancial aid and authoritarian institutions.

For a long time, scholars are debating whether nancial aid is able to facilitate

development and governance. Though abundant evidence is provided, the answer is

still inconclusive. On the other hand, scholars investigating China argue that the

leadership uses various institutions to ensure local ocials' compliance. In this paper,

we nd that the nancial aid does not bring a positive impact and the central

government in China does not have enough monitoring capacity to force local o-

cials to comply. We study a redevelopment program established by Chinese central

government after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. By adopting a geographic regression

discontinuity combining with a dierence-in-dierences design, we show that

the redevelopment program does not signicantly develop the disaster area. On the

contrary, the evidence implies that the economy in the disaster area is worse after

receiving the aid. The results imply that local ocials do not follow the central government's

regulations and misuse the aid money for other purposes. In the future, we

expect to further investigate through which mechanism do local ocials undermine

the existing institutions.

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