An examination of the effects of government purchases in an open economy

This paper examines the effects of permanent and transitory changes in government purchases in the context of a model of a small open economy that produces and consumes both traded and nontraded goods. The model incorporates an equilibrium interpretation of the business cycle that emphasizes the responsiveness of agents to intertemporal relative price changes. It is demonstrated that transitory increases in government purchases lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an ambiguous change (although a likely worsening) in the current account, while permanent increases have an ambiguous impact on the real exchange rate and no effect on the current account. When agents do not know whether a given increase in government purchases is permanent or transitory the effect is a weighted average of these separate effects. The weights depend on the relative variances of the transitory and permanent components of government purchases. © 1985.

Bayesian Model Averaging in the M-Open Framework

This chapter presents a model averaging approach in the M-open setting using sample re-use methods to approximate the predictive distribution of future observations. It first reviews the standard M-closed Bayesian Model Averaging approach and decision-theoretic methods for producing inferences and decisions. It then reviews model selection from the M-complete and M-open perspectives, before formulating a Bayesian solution to model averaging in the M-open perspective. It constructs optimal weights for MOMA:M-open Model Averaging using a decision-theoretic framework, where models are treated as part of the ‘action space’ rather than unknown states of nature. Using ‘incompatible’ retrospective and prospective models for data from a case-control study, the chapter demonstrates that MOMA gives better predictive accuracy than the proxy models. It concludes with open questions and future directions.

Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.