Agglomeration effects in foreign direct investment and the pollution haven hypothesis

Does environmental regulation impair international competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries to the extent that they relocate to countries with less stringent regulation, turning those countries into "pollution havens"? We test this hypothesis using panel data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector and account for several econometric issues that have been ignored in previous studies. Most importantly, we demonstrate that externalities associated with FDI agglomeration can bias estimates away from finding a pollution haven effect if omitted from the analysis. We include the stock of inward FDI as a proxy for agglomeration and employ a GMM estimator to control for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows. Furthermore, we propose a difference estimator based on the least polluting industry to break the possible correlation between environmental regulatory stringency and unobservable attributes of FDI recipients in the cross-section. When accounting for these issues we find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Encouraging clean energy investment in developing countries: what role for aid?

A large portion of foreign assistance for climate change mitigation in developing countries is directed to clean energy facilities. To support international mitigation goals, however, donors must make investments that have effects beyond individual facilities. They must reduce barriers to private-sector investment by generating information for developers, improving relevant infrastructure, or changing policies. We examine whether donor agencies target financing for commercial-scale wind and solar facilities to countries where private investment in clean energy is limited and whether donor investments lead to more private investments. On average, we find no positive evidence for these patterns of targeting and impact. Coupled with model results that show feed-in tariffs increase private investment, we argue that donor agencies should reallocate resources to improve policies that promote private investment in developing countries, rather than finance individual clean energy facilities.

Learning from Incredible Commitments: Evolution and Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Ostensibly, BITs are the ideal international treaty. First, until just recently, they almost uniformly came with explicit dispute resolution mechanisms through which countries could face real costs for violation (Montt 2009). Second, the signing, ratification, and violation of them are easily accessible public knowledge. Thus countries presumably would face reputational costs for violating these agreements. Yet, these compliance devices have not dissuaded states from violating these agreements. Even more interestingly, in recent years, both developed and developing countries have moved towards modifying the investor-friendly provisions of these agreements. These deviations from the expectations of the credible commitment argument raise important questions about the field's assumptions regarding the ability of international treaties with commitment devices to effectively constrain state behavior.