Agglomeration effects in foreign direct investment and the pollution haven hypothesis

Does environmental regulation impair international competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries to the extent that they relocate to countries with less stringent regulation, turning those countries into "pollution havens"? We test this hypothesis using panel data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector and account for several econometric issues that have been ignored in previous studies. Most importantly, we demonstrate that externalities associated with FDI agglomeration can bias estimates away from finding a pollution haven effect if omitted from the analysis. We include the stock of inward FDI as a proxy for agglomeration and employ a GMM estimator to control for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows. Furthermore, we propose a difference estimator based on the least polluting industry to break the possible correlation between environmental regulatory stringency and unobservable attributes of FDI recipients in the cross-section. When accounting for these issues we find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Essays on the Dynamic Decisions of Homeowners and Retailers

Urban problems have several features that make them inherently dynamic. Large transaction costs all but guarantee that homeowners will do their best to consider how a neighborhood might change before buying a house. Similarly, stores face large sunk costs when opening, and want to be sure that their investment will pay off in the long run. In line with those concerns, different areas of Economics have made recent advances in modeling those questions within a dynamic framework. This dissertation contributes to those efforts.

Chapter 2 discusses how to model an agent’s location decision when the agent must learn about an exogenous amenity that may be changing over time. The model is applied to estimating the marginal willingness to pay to avoid crime, in which agents are learning about the crime rate in a neighborhood, and the crime rate can change in predictable (Markovian) ways.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on location decision problems when there are externalities between decision makers. Chapter 3 focuses on the decision of business owners to open a store, when its demand is a function of other nearby stores, either through competition, or through spillovers on foot traffic. It uses a dynamic model in continuous time to model agents’ decisions. A particular challenge is isolating the contribution of spillovers from the contribution of other unobserved neighborhood attributes that could also lead to agglomeration. A key contribution of this chapter is showing how we can use information on storefront ownership to help separately identify spillovers.

Finally, chapter 4 focuses on a class of models in which families prefer to live

close to similar neighbors. This chapter provides the first simulation of such a model in which agents are forward looking, and shows that this leads to more segregation than it would have been observed with myopic agents, which is the standard in this literature. The chapter also discusses several extensions of the model that can be used to investigate relevant questions such as the arrival of a large contingent high skilled tech workers in San Francisco, the immigration of hispanic families to several southern American cities, large changes in local amenities, such as the construction of magnet schools or metro stations, and the flight of wealthy residents from cities in the Rust belt, such as Detroit.

Essays on Banking Competition

I study local shocks to consumer credit supply arising from the opening

of bank-related retail stores. Bank-related store openings coincide with

sharp increases in credit card placements in the neighborhood of the

store, in the months surrounding the store opening, and with the bank

that owns the store. I exploit this relationship to instrument for new

credit cards at the individual level, and find that obtaining a new

credit card sharply increases total borrowing as well as default risk,

particularly for risky and opaque borrowers. In line with theories of

default externality, I observe that existing lenders react to the

increased consumer borrowing and associated riskiness by contracting

their own supply. In particular, in the year following the issuance of a

new credit card, banks without links to stores reduce credit card limits

by 24-51%, offsetting most of the initial increase in total credit

limits.

Latent Space and Social Psychological Models of Diffusion

The problem of social diffusion has animated sociological thinking on topics ranging from the spread of an idea, an innovation or a disease, to the foundations of collective behavior and political polarization. While network diffusion has been a productive metaphor, the reality of diffusion processes is often muddier. Ideas and innovations diffuse differently from diseases, but, with a few exceptions, the diffusion of ideas and innovations has been modeled under the same assumptions as the diffusion of disease. In this dissertation, I develop two new diffusion models for "socially meaningful" contagions that address two of the most significant problems with current diffusion models: (1) that contagions can only spread along observed ties, and (2) that contagions do not change as they spread between people. I augment insights from these statistical and simulation models with an analysis of an empirical case of diffusion - the use of enterprise collaboration software in a large technology company. I focus the empirical study on when people abandon innovations, a crucial, and understudied aspect of the diffusion of innovations. Using timestamped posts, I analyze when people abandon software to a high degree of detail.

To address the first problem, I suggest a latent space diffusion model. Rather than treating ties as stable conduits for information, the latent space diffusion model treats ties as random draws from an underlying social space, and simulates diffusion over the social space. Theoretically, the social space model integrates both actor ties and attributes simultaneously in a single social plane, while incorporating schemas into diffusion processes gives an explicit form to the reciprocal influences that cognition and social environment have on each other. Practically, the latent space diffusion model produces statistically consistent diffusion estimates where using the network alone does not, and the diffusion with schemas model shows that introducing some cognitive processing into diffusion processes changes the rate and ultimate distribution of the spreading information. To address the second problem, I suggest a diffusion model with schemas. Rather than treating information as though it is spread without changes, the schema diffusion model allows people to modify information they receive to fit an underlying mental model of the information before they pass the information to others. Combining the latent space models with a schema notion for actors improves our models for social diffusion both theoretically and practically.

The empirical case study focuses on how the changing value of an innovation, introduced by the innovations' network externalities, influences when people abandon the innovation. In it, I find that people are least likely to abandon an innovation when other people in their neighborhood currently use the software as well. The effect is particularly pronounced for supervisors' current use and number of supervisory team members who currently use the software. This case study not only points to an important process in the diffusion of innovation, but also suggests a new approach -- computerized collaboration systems -- to collecting and analyzing data on organizational processes.

Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.