Increasing Motorcycle Taxi Driver Conspicuity in Tanzania

Motorcycle crash related injuries and deaths are increasing rapidly in many African nations. Utilizing conspicuity measures, such as wearing reflective, fluorescent safety vests, are effective as crash prevention strategies. Furthermore, use of some conspicuity measures is mandated by law among motorcycle-taxi drivers in Tanzania. Nonetheless, uptake remains low. Locally appropriate strategies to improve crash preventative behaviors are needed.

To explore whether use of conspicuity measures could be improved through eliminating cost-barriers, we tested a distribution strategy involving the provision of free motorcycle safety vests among a population of motorcycle-taxi drivers in Moshi, Tanzania. We conducted a cluster randomized controlled trial among 180 motorcycle-taxi drivers in which half of the participants (90) were randomized to the intervention arm and received a free reflective vest. The other half of the participants (90) were randomized to the control arm and did not receive free vests. Whether motorcycle taxi drivers used the reflective vest was then unobtrusively observed on city streets over a period of three months.

Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to estimate differential uptake of the vests between trial arms. At baseline, 3.3% of individuals in both arms used a reflective vest. In three months of follow-up, 79 drivers in the intervention arm and 82 drivers in the control arm were able to be observed. In the intervention arm the average proportion of observations during which drivers were observed to be using a reflective vest was 9.5%, compared to 2.0% in the control arm (odds ratio: 5.5, 95% confidence interval: 1.1-26.9, p-value: 0.04). Distribution of free reflective vests did lead to an increase in vest usage, however, the increase was minimal. Removing economic barriers alone appears insufficient to adequately improve adherence to conspicuity measures.

Evidence for GC-biased gene conversion as a driver of between-lineage differences in avian base composition.

BACKGROUND: While effective population size (Ne) and life history traits such as generation time are known to impact substitution rates, their potential effects on base composition evolution are less well understood. GC content increases with decreasing body mass in mammals, consistent with recombination-associated GC biased gene conversion (gBGC) more strongly impacting these lineages. However, shifts in chromosomal architecture and recombination landscapes between species may complicate the interpretation of these results. In birds, interchromosomal rearrangements are rare and the recombination landscape is conserved, suggesting that this group is well suited to assess the impact of life history on base composition. RESULTS: Employing data from 45 newly and 3 previously sequenced avian genomes covering a broad range of taxa, we found that lineages with large populations and short generations exhibit higher GC content. The effect extends to both coding and non-coding sites, indicating that it is not due to selection on codon usage. Consistent with recombination driving base composition, GC content and heterogeneity were positively correlated with the rate of recombination. Moreover, we observed ongoing increases in GC in the majority of lineages. CONCLUSIONS: Our results provide evidence that gBGC may drive patterns of nucleotide composition in avian genomes and are consistent with more effective gBGC in large populations and a greater number of meioses per unit time; that is, a shorter generation time. Thus, in accord with theoretical predictions, base composition evolution is substantially modulated by species life history.

Game-Theoretically Allocating Resources to Catch Evaders and Payments to Stabilize Teams

Allocating resources optimally is a nontrivial task, especially when multiple

self-interested agents with conflicting goals are involved. This dissertation

uses techniques from game theory to study two classes of such problems:

allocating resources to catch agents that attempt to evade them, and allocating

payments to agents in a team in order to stabilize it. Besides discussing what

allocations are optimal from various game-theoretic perspectives, we also study

how to efficiently compute them, and if no such algorithms are found, what

computational hardness results can be proved.

The first class of problems is inspired by real-world applications such as the

TOEFL iBT test, course final exams, driver's license tests, and airport security

patrols. We call them test games and security games. This dissertation first

studies test games separately, and then proposes a framework of Catcher-Evader

games (CE games) that generalizes both test games and security games. We show

that the optimal test strategy can be efficiently computed for scored test

games, but it is hard to compute for many binary test games. Optimal Stackelberg

strategies are hard to compute for CE games, but we give an empirically

efficient algorithm for computing their Nash equilibria. We also prove that the

Nash equilibria of a CE game are interchangeable.

The second class of problems involves how to split a reward that is collectively

obtained by a team. For example, how should a startup distribute its shares, and

what salary should an enterprise pay to its employees. Several stability-based

solution concepts in cooperative game theory, such as the core, the least core,

and the nucleolus, are well suited to this purpose when the goal is to avoid

coalitions of agents breaking off. We show that some of these solution concepts

can be justified as the most stable payments under noise. Moreover, by adjusting

the noise models (to be arguably more realistic), we obtain new solution

concepts including the partial nucleolus, the multiplicative least core, and the

multiplicative nucleolus. We then study the computational complexity of those

solution concepts under the constraint of superadditivity. Our result is based

on what we call Small-Issues-Large-Team games and it applies to popular

representation schemes such as MC-nets.

Role of patient factors, preferences, and distrust in health care and access to liver transplantation and organ donation.

Despite major improvements in access to liver transplantation (LT), disparities remain. Little is known about how distrust in medical care, patient preferences, and the origins shaping those preferences contribute to differences surrounding access. We performed a single-center, cross-sectional survey of adults with end-stage liver disease and compared responses between LT listed and nonlisted patients as well as by race. Questionnaires were administered to 109 patients (72 nonlisted; 37 listed) to assess demographics, health care system distrust (HCSD), religiosity, and factors influencing LT and organ donation (OD). We found that neither HCSD nor religiosity explained differences in access to LT in our population. Listed patients attained higher education levels and were more likely to be insured privately. This was also the case for white versus black patients. All patients reported wanting LT if recommended. However, nonlisted patients were significantly less likely to have discussed LT with their physician or to be referred to a transplant center. They were also much less likely to understand the process of LT. Fewer blacks were referred (44.4% versus 69.7%; P = 0.03) or went to the transplant center if referred (44.4% versus 71.1%; P = 0.02). Fewer black patients felt that minorities had as equal access to LT as whites (29.6% versus 57.3%; P < 0.001). For OD, there were more significant differences in preferences by race than listing status. More whites indicated OD status on their driver's license, and more blacks were likely to become an organ donor if approached by someone of the same cultural or ethnic background (P < 0.01). In conclusion, our analysis demonstrates persistent barriers to LT and OD. With improved patient and provider education and communication, many of these disparities could be successfully overcome. Liver Transplantation 22 895-905 2016 AASLD.