Nonparametric estimation of structural models for high-frequency currency market data

Empirical modeling of high-frequency currency market data reveals substantial evidence for nonnormality, stochastic volatility, and other nonlinearities. This paper investigates whether an equilibrium monetary model can account for nonlinearities in weekly data. The model incorporates time-nonseparable preferences and a transaction cost technology. Simulated sample paths are generated using Marcet's parameterized expectations procedure. The paper also develops a new method for estimation of structural economic models. The method forces the model to match (under a GMM criterion) the score function of a nonparametric estimate of the conditional density of observed data. The estimation uses weekly U.S.-German currency market data, 1975-90. © 1995.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.

Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining

We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in the negotiations. We find that making public commitments provides bargaining leverage, when backing down from such commitments carries domestic political costs. However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a public demand is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome. Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for secret negotiations. Testable hypotheses are derived from the nature of the commitments and agreements made in equilibrium.