Credit scores, cardiovascular disease risk, and human capital.

Credit scores are the most widely used instruments to assess whether or not a person is a financial risk. Credit scoring has been so successful that it has expanded beyond lending and into our everyday lives, even to inform how insurers evaluate our health. The pervasive application of credit scoring has outpaced knowledge about why credit scores are such useful indicators of individual behavior. Here we test if the same factors that lead to poor credit scores also lead to poor health. Following the Dunedin (New Zealand) Longitudinal Study cohort of 1,037 study members, we examined the association between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk and the underlying factors that account for this association. We find that credit scores are negatively correlated with cardiovascular disease risk. Variation in household income was not sufficient to account for this association. Rather, individual differences in human capital factors—educational attainment, cognitive ability, and self-control—predicted both credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk and accounted for ∼45% of the correlation between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk. Tracing human capital factors back to their childhood antecedents revealed that the characteristic attitudes, behaviors, and competencies children develop in their first decade of life account for a significant portion (∼22%) of the link between credit scores and cardiovascular disease risk at midlife. We discuss the implications of these findings for policy debates about data privacy, financial literacy, and early childhood interventions.

Essays on Banking Competition

I study local shocks to consumer credit supply arising from the opening

of bank-related retail stores. Bank-related store openings coincide with

sharp increases in credit card placements in the neighborhood of the

store, in the months surrounding the store opening, and with the bank

that owns the store. I exploit this relationship to instrument for new

credit cards at the individual level, and find that obtaining a new

credit card sharply increases total borrowing as well as default risk,

particularly for risky and opaque borrowers. In line with theories of

default externality, I observe that existing lenders react to the

increased consumer borrowing and associated riskiness by contracting

their own supply. In particular, in the year following the issuance of a

new credit card, banks without links to stores reduce credit card limits

by 24-51%, offsetting most of the initial increase in total credit

limits.