Estimating stochastic volatility diffusion using conditional moments of integrated volatility

We exploit the distributional information contained in high-frequency intraday data in constructing a simple conditional moment estimator for stochastic volatility diffusions. The estimator is based on the analytical solutions of the first two conditional moments for the latent integrated volatility, the realization of which is effectively approximated by the sum of the squared high-frequency increments of the process. Our simulation evidence indicates that the resulting GMM estimator is highly reliable and accurate. Our empirical implementation based on high-frequency five-minute foreign exchange returns suggests the presence of multiple latent stochastic volatility factors and possible jumps. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Prediction in dynamic models with time-dependent conditional variances

This paper considers forecasting the conditional mean and variance from a single-equation dynamic model with autocorrelated disturbances following an ARMA process, and innovations with time-dependent conditional heteroskedasticity as represented by a linear GARCH process. Expressions for the minimum MSE predictor and the conditional MSE are presented. We also derive the formula for all the theoretical moments of the prediction error distribution from a general dynamic model with GARCH(1, 1) innovations. These results are then used in the construction of ex ante prediction confidence intervals by means of the Cornish-Fisher asymptotic expansion. An empirical example relating to the uncertainty of the expected depreciation of foreign exchange rates illustrates the usefulness of the results. © 1992.

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.