Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: Is biotech different?

The costs of developing the types of new drugs that have been pursued by traditional pharmaceutical firms have been estimated in a number of studies. However, similar analyses have not been published on the costs of developing the types of molecules on which biotech firms have focused. This study represents a first attempt to get a sense for the magnitude of the R&D costs associated with the discovery and development of new therapeutic biopharmaceuticals (specifically, recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies [mAbs]). We utilize drug-specific data on cash outlays, development times, and success in obtaining regulatory marketing approval to estimate the average pre-tax R&D resource cost for biopharmaceuticals up to the point of initial US marketing approval (in year 2005 dollars). We found average out-of-pocket (cash outlay) cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $198 million, $361 million, and $559 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Including the time costs associated with biopharmaceutical R&D, we found average capitalized cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $615 million, $626 million, and $1241 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Adjusting previously published estimates of R&D costs for traditional pharmaceutical firms by using past growth rates for pharmaceutical company costs to correspond to the more recent period to which our biopharmaceutical data apply, we found that total out-of-pocket cost per approved biopharmaceutical was somewhat lower than for the pharmaceutical company data ($559 million vs $672 million). However, estimated total capitalized cost per approved new molecule was nearly the same for biopharmaceuticals as for the adjusted pharmaceutical company data ($1241 million versus $1318 million). The results should be viewed with some caution for now given a limited number of biopharmaceutical molecules with data on cash outlays, different therapeutic class distributions for biopharmaceuticals and for pharmaceutical company drugs, and uncertainty about whether recent growth rates in pharmaceutical company costs are different from immediate past growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity program.

CONTEXT: In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007. OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials. DESIGN AND SETTING: A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio. RESULTS: The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63). CONCLUSIONS: The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.

Optimal Reporting Systems With Investor Information Acquisition

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal ex-ante reporting system using a Bayesian persuasion approach (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) in a setting where investors affect cash flows through their decision to finance the firm's investment opportunities, possibly assisted by the costly acquisition of additional information (inspection). I examine how the informativeness and the bias of the optimal system are determined by investors' inspection cost, the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the investor, and the prior belief that the project is profitable. I find that a mis-aligned manager's system is informative

only when the market prior is pessimistic and is always positively biased; this bias decreases as investors' inspection cost decreases. In contrast, a well-aligned manager's system is fully revealing when investors' inspection cost is high, and is counter-cyclical to the market belief when the inspection cost is low: It is positively (negatively) biased when the market belief is pessimistic (optimistic). Furthermore, I explore the extent to which the results generalize to a case with managerial manipulation and discuss the implications for investment efficiency. Overall, the analysis describes the complex interactions among determinants of firm disclosures and governance, and offers explanations for the mixed empirical results in this area.

Essays in Macro Finance

I study the link between capital markets and sources of macroeconomic risk. In chapter 1 I show that expected inflation risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns even after controlling for cash flow growth and volatility risks. Motivated by this evidence I study a long run risk model with a built-in inflation non-neutrality channel that allows me to decompose the real stochastic discount factor into news about current and expected cash flow growth, news about expected inflation and news about volatility. The model can successfully price a broad menu of assets and provides a setting for analyzing cross sectional variation in expected inflation risk premium. For industries like retail and durable goods inflation risk can account for nearly a third of the overall risk premium while the energy industry and a broad commodity index act like inflation hedges. Nominal bonds are exposed to expected inflation risk and have inflation premiums that increase with bond maturity. The price of expected inflation risk was very high during the 70's and 80's, but has come down a lot since being very close to zero over the past decade. On average, the expected inflation price of risk is negative, consistent with the view that periods of high inflation represent a "bad" state of the world and are associated with low economic growth and poor stock market performance. In chapter 2 I look at the way capital markets react to predetermined macroeconomic announcements. I document significantly higher excess returns on the US stock market on macro release dates as compared to days when no macroeconomic news hit the market. Almost the entire equity premium since 1997 is being realized on days when macroeconomic news are released. At high frequency, there is a pattern of returns increasing in the hours prior to the pre-determined announcement time, peaking around the time of the announcement and dropping thereafter.

Fearonomics and the Role of Nigeria's Private Sector in the Nigerian Ebola Response

Background: Outbreaks of infectious diseases such as Ebola have dramatic economic impacts on affected nations due to significant direct costs and indirect costs, as well as increased expenditure by the government to meet the health and security crisis. Despite its dense population, Nigeria was able to contain the outbreak swiftly and was declared Ebola free on 13th October 2014. Although Nigeria’s Ebola containment success was multifaceted, the private sector played a key role in Nigeria’s fight against Ebola. An epidemic of a disease like Ebola, not only consumes health resources but also detrimentally disrupts trade and travel to impact both public and private sector resulting in the ‘fearonomic’ effect of the contagion. In this thesis, I have defined ‘fearonomics’ or the ‘fearonomic effects’ of a disease as the intangible and intangible economic effects of both informed and misinformed aversion behavior exhibited by individuals, organizations, or countries during an outbreak. During an infectious disease outbreak, there is a significant potential for public-private sector collaborations that can help offset some of the government’s cost of controlling the epidemic.

Objective: The main objective of this study is to understand the ‘fearonomics’ of Ebola in Nigeria and to evaluate the role of the key private sector stakeholders in Nigeria’s Ebola response.

Methods: This retrospective qualitative study was conducted in Nigeria and utilizes grounded theory to look across different economic sectors in Nigeria to understand the impact of Ebola on Nigeria’s private sector and how it dealt with the various challenges posed by the disease and its ‘fearonomic effects'.

Results: Due to swift containment of Ebola in Nigeria, the economic impact of the disease was limited especially in comparison to the other Ebola-infected countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. However, the 2014 Ebola outbreak had more than a just direct impact on the country’s economy and despite the swift containment, no economic sector was immune to the disease’s fearonomic impact. The potential scale of the fearonomic impact of a disease like Ebola was one of the key motivators for the private sector engagement in the Ebola response.

The private sector in Nigeria played an essential role in facilitating the country’s response to Ebola. The private sector not only provided in-cash donations but significant in-kind support to both the Federal and State governments during the outbreak. Swift establishment of an Ebola Emergency Operation Centre (EEOC) was essential to the country’s response and was greatly facilitated by the private sector, showcasing the crucial role of private sector in the initial phase of an outbreak. The private sector contributed to Nigeria’s fight against Ebola not only by donating material assets but by continuing operations and partaking in knowledge sharing and advocacy. Some sector such as the private health sector, telecom sector, financial sector, oil and gas sector played a unique role in orchestrating the Nigerian Ebola response and were among the first movers during the outbreak.

This paper utilizes the lessons from Nigeria’s containment of Ebola to highlight the potential of public-private partnerships in preparedness, response, and recovery during an outbreak.

The Barriers to the Integration of the Uterine Balloon Tamponade into South Africa and Ghana's Health Systems for the Management of Postpartum Hemorrhage

Background

Postpartum hemorrhage is the most significant contributor to maternal mortality globally, claiming 140,000 lives annually. Postpartum hemorrhage is a leading cause of maternal death in South Africa, with the literature indicating that 80 percent of the postpartum hemorrhage deaths in South Africa are avoidable. Ghana, as of 2010, witnesses 2700 maternal deaths annually, primarily because of poor quality of care in health facilities and services being difficult to access. As per WHO recommendations, uterotonics are integral to treating postpartum hemorrhage as soon as it is diagnosed. In case of persistent bleeding or limited availability of uterotonics, the uterine balloon tamponade (UBT) can be used as a second line of defense. If both these measures are unable to counter the bleeding, providers must perform surgical interventions. Literature on the UBT, as one tool in the protocol to address postpartum hemorrhage, has shown it to have success rates ranging from 60 to 100 percent. Despite the potential to lower the number of postpartum hemorrhage deaths in South Africa and Ghana, the UBT has not been incorporated widely in South Africa and Ghana. The aim of this study is to describe the barriers involved with integrating the UBT into South Africa and Ghana’s health systems to address postpartum hemorrhage.

Methods

The study took place in multiple sites in South Africa (Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban and Mpumalanga) and in Accra, Ghana. South Africa and Ghana were selected because postpartum hemorrhage contributes greatly to their maternal mortality numbers and there is potential in both countries to lower those rates through greater use of the UBT. A total of 25 participants were interviewed through purposive sampling, snowball sampling and participant referrals, and included various categories of stakeholders integral to the integration process of a medical device. Individual in-depth interviews were used for data collection, with interview questions being tailored to each stakeholder category. The focus of the interviews was on the protocol used to counter postpartum hemorrhage, the frequency with which the UBT is used as part of the protocol, and the process of integrating it into the South Africa and Ghana’s health systems. The data collected were coded using NVivo and analyzed using content analysis.

Results

The barriers to integration of the uterine balloon tamponade to address postpartum hemorrhage in South Africa and Ghana were evident on the political, economic and health delivery levels. The results indicated that the barriers to integration in South Africa included the low recognition of postpartum hemorrhage as a problem, the lack of clarity surrounding the role of the Medicines Control Council as a regulatory body for medical devices, and low awareness of the UBT as an intervention to control postpartum hemorrhage. The barriers in Ghana were the cash constraints experienced by the Ghana Health Services to fund medical devices, a heavy reliance on donors for funding, and the lack of consistent knowledge on processes involving clinical trials for new medical devices in Ghana.

Conclusion

Existing literature on methods to counter postpartum hemorrhage to reduce maternal mortality has focused on and emphasized the efficacy of the UBT. Despite overwhelming evidence supporting the use of the UBT, many health systems across the world, particularly low-income countries, do not have access to the device owing to numerous barriers in integrating the device into obstetric care. This study illustrates the need to focus on incorporating the UBT into health systems for greater availability to health workers and its use as standard of care. Ultimately, this study can be used as a stepping-stone for more research on this subject, providing evidence to influence policymakers to integrate the UBT into their protocols for postpartum hemorrhage response.